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ABSTRACT 
The study of mergers and acquisitions represents a broad interdisciplinary field of research. 
Mergers and acquisitions are ever present in the corporate world, and they have become an 
increasingly important part of corporate strategies. However, not all attempts to undertake a 
merger between two companies are successful: the reported failure rate in mergers and 
acquisitions is actually high. So, why do some mergers succeed whereas others fail? The 
literature in this field points to several possible answers to this question. This study intends to 
open a new research direction in this field by drawing insights from the literature on 
technological and organizational innovation for the study of the determinants of mergers’ 
success and failures. The empirical analysis focuses on the comparison of two different 
mergers, one that was cancelled and one that was successful. The successful case is the 
merger between Statoil and Hydro in 2007, and the failure case is the attempt to merge made 
by Telenor and Telia in 1999. The main findings of the thesis are that the main factors 
explaining the success of a merger are the similarities and complementarities of the two 
merging companies in terms of their respective organizational structures, business strategies 
and external policy environment.  
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1. Introduction 
“Norway is the last Soviet state” 
 
The Swedish Minister of Trade and Industry, Bjørn Rosengren gave this famous citation in 
the merger negotiations between Telia and Telenor in 1999, and today the citation stands as a 
heritage of the failed merger attempt. In this study I have chosen two large-scale mergers, the 
merger of Statoil and Hydro’s oil and gas activities, and the failed attempt made by Telenor 
and Telia to merge their telecom activities. The former case represents a successful merger 
between two giants in the Norwegian context, and the latter case a failed merger attempt that 
crosses the national borders of Norway and Sweden. Telenor and Telia were the two leading 
telecom companies in Scandinavia at the time of the merger attempt. They were both 
government-owned companies with similar histories and development. The merger attempt 
was also intergovernmental as it crossed the national borders of the two countries. Despite 
similarities and nearness in national culture, corporate practice, language, and despite the fact 
that the EU had approved the merger, the Telia-Telenor negotiation eventually broke down. 
On December 16th 1999, the Telia-Telenor merger ended after only two months in existence. 
What went wrong? By investigating the motives and strategies, the organizational and 
strategical fit of the two companies, I will explain why this merger did not happen. 
 
“The merger ensures long-term value creation for shareholders, continued 
development of competence and innovation and a further strengthening of 
Norway´s role as a globally leading energy supplier”  
 
This citation was given by the CEO of Hydro, Eivind Reiten on the day of the stock market 
announcement of the Statoil-Hydro merger in December 2006. The citation indicates both the 
merger in a national setting and in the global energy industry. In a national setting the merger 
represented a combination of two major industrial actors, which had both played important 
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roles in developing Norway as an oil nation in the previous decades. Both companies had 
through their activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf acquired competence and 
technologies, that when combined would give them the capabilities and strength necessary to 
pursue international growth and to continue to develop on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
Why did this merger succeed in achieving its objectives? Again, by investigating the motives 
and strategies, the organizational and strategical fit of the two merging companies, I will 
explain why this merger succeeded. 
 
1 
 
The field of mergers and acquisitions have received extensive attention in recent decades 
from practitioners and academics in various fields, and the approaches have been from a 
multitude of theoretical frameworks. Research on mergers is clearly an interdisciplinary field, 
and the research on the subject is extensive (Sherman, 2010; Gaughan 2011). The units of 
analysis in this thesis are the two merger cases, and therefore the four companies involved in 
the cases. The thesis will present the four companies and the merger plans. Both the merger 
cases analysed in this thesis include sectors, industries and companies with a high level of 
innovation in products and processes, along with high investments in research and 
development (R&D). By trying to link the literature on mergers and innovation together, this 
study intends to open a new research direction in this field. By selecting two different 
mergers, one that was cancelled and one that is regarded as a success, makes it possible to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Defining the research questions is probably the most important step in a study (Yin, 2009). Research questions 
do five main things according to Punch (2005); they organize the project, and give it direction and coherence; 
they delimit the project, showing its boundaries; they keep the researcher focused during the project; they 
provide a framework for writing up the project; and they point out the data that will be needed. 	  
Research Question: 
What are the factors that can explain merger success and failure? 
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explore, understand and highlight both the differences and the similarities in the selected 
cases. A variety of questions on organizational change and other relevant issues emerge. 
Explaining the reasons that one merger succeeded and another failed is an interesting topic. It 
will also be interesting to explore whether the cases reveal similar or different motives for 
undertaking the merging process. Further, it could be valuable for future merging parties to 
learn from the experience of both the success and the failure case. 
 
By choosing different mergers with two different outcomes, I will make compare the motives, 
contexts, strategies and other factors involved. The literature and research on mergers and 
acquisitions argues that synergy, growth and management motives are most often the reason 
why mergers and acquisitions occur. I have chosen the resource-dependence perspective as 
the theoretical framework to explain these types of organizational changes. This perspective 
emphasizes how organizations become dependent on both their own resources and assets, and 
on the organizational environment in which they operate. To understand why some mergers 
fail and some succeed, the merger literature suggests that the pre-merger planning and the 
post-merger integration are crucial in understanding the outcome of the deal. In an attempt to 
extend the existing literature, the theoretical part of this thesis argues that the strategic, 
organizational and environmental fit of the merging companies represent the central factors to 
understand merger outcomes. Indeed, the empirical analysis carried out in the second part of 
this work suggests that the external policy context, and the motives, strategies, structures and 
assets of the merging companies turn out to be the crucial factors to explain success and 
failure of the two selected cases. In particular, in the failure case, I will show how the 
different strategies, the lack of organizational fit and political battles between the Norwegian 
and Swedish national authorities contributed to make the merger a failure. In the success case, 
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on the other hand, I will show how similar resources, complementary strategies, and a 
favourable political environment made this case a success. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 the literature on mergers and acquisitions will 
be presented, in chapter 3 the literature on innovation and organizational change. In chapter 4 
I will present some general propositions that explain the main factors that are relevant to 
explain the outcome of a merger, and that try to link more explicitly the merger literature and 
the innovation literature. Chapter 5 will present the methodology adopted for the empirical 
analysis. Chapter 6 and 7 will present the two selected merger cases. Chapter 8 will carry out 
a comparison of the two cases and a discussion of the empirical validity of the hypotheses of 
the work, and chapter 9 will conclude and briefly point to some possible limitations and future 
extensions of this line of research. 
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2. Mergers and Acquisitions 
The phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions (M&A2) has developed to become a highly 
popular form of corporate development to create growth and diversity (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006). M&A are a vital part of both healthy and weak economies and are often 
the primary way in which companies are able to provide returns to their investors, 
stakeholders and owners (Sherman, 2010). M&A enable strong companies to grow faster than 
their competitors, and ensure that weaker companies are acquired. The pace of M&A picked 
up in the early 2000s, and in 2004 there were over 30 000 acquisitions completed around the 
world (Gaughan, 2011; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006). Sikora (2006) explains the 
increasing numbers of M&A with factors such as low inflation, deregulation and a rising 
stock market. In recent years there have also been a significant increase in M&A activity 
within industries that are growing rapidly overall, such as health care, information 
technology, education infrastructure and software development, as well as in traditional 
industries such as manufacturing, consumer products and food services. The increase in M&A 
activity has given rise to the growth of academic research on this topic, and the rapidly 
evolving nature of M&A also requires constant updating in the research field (Sherman, 2010; 
Gaughan, 2011). In this chapter I will give a brief introduction to current research on M&A, 
including definitions, descriptions on different types of mergers and merger motives, and a 
framework on how to understand merger success and failure. 
 
2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions - definitions 
Mergers and acquisitions are closely connected, but it is important to separate the two. 
Gaughan (2011: 12) defines mergers as “a combination of two corporations in which only the 
one corporation survives and the merged corporation goes out of existence”. Meaning that in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  M&A is a widely used abbreviation in both research and literature on mergers and acquisitions.  
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a merger, the acquiring company takes over the assets and liabilities of the merged company. 
An acquisition is “to take over ownership of another organization, firm, company etc.” 
(Johnson et al., 2006: 349). Sherman (2010: 3) defines a merger as “a combination of two ore 
more companies in which the assets and liabilities of the selling firm(s) are absorbed by the 
buying firm. Although the buying firm may be a different organization after the merger, it 
retains its original identity”. Further he defines an acquisition as “the purchase of an asset 
such as a plant, a division, or even an entire company” (Sherman, 2010:3) Peng (2006: 377) 
defines a merger as “the combination of assets, operations, and management of two firms to 
establish a new legal entity”, and an acquisition as “the transfer of control of assets, 
operations, and management from one firm (target) to another (acquirer)”. On the surface, 
these distinctions may not matter, since the result is often the same; two (or more) companies 
that originally had separate ownership are now operating together to obtain some strategic or 
financial objective. Yet, the strategic, financial, tax, and cultural impact of the deals may be 
very different in both. While it would be interesting to shed light on both processes, the object 
of study in this thesis is the process of mergers.  
 
As important as a distinction between a merger and an acquisition is, it is also important to 
distinguish between a merger and a consolidation. The latter is a business combination where 
two or more companies join to form an entirely new company. Another term used widely in 
the field of M&A transactions is a takeover. This term however is vague; sometimes it refers 
only to hostile transactions, and other times it could refer to both friendly and unfriendly 
mergers (Gaughan, 2011). 
 
In mergers of equals, two companies combine in a friendly deal that is a result of extensive 
negotiations between the management teams or the owners of both companies, and 
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particularly between the CEOs of both companies. A merger of equals is often defined as “the 
combination of two firms of about the same size to form a new company” (Colman et al., 
2011:19). Both of the mergers in this study are mergers of equals. 
 
2.2 Types of Mergers 
Mergers can be categorized into three different types: the vertical integration mergers; the 
horizontal mergers; and the diversification/conglomerate. The first type, vertical mergers are 
combinations of companies that have a buyer-seller relationship or are symbiotically related. 
These mergers happen when organizations that are engaged in related functions but at 
different stages in the production process merge with one another (Scott, 2003; Gaughan, 
2011). According to Pfeffer (1972) research supports an expectation that mergers involving 
vertical integration are more likely to occur among companies in industries engaged in 
frequent transactions.  
 
The second type, horizontal mergers, occurs when organizations performing similar functions 
merge to increase the scale of their operations. It occurs e.g. when two competitors combine, 
and economies of scale are realized (Scott, 2003; Gaughan, 2011). Pfeffer (1972) argues that 
horizontal mergers are more likely to occur among firms located in industries exhibiting 
intermediate levels of concentration, meaning situations of maximum intra-industry 
competition. If a horizontal merger causes the merged companies to experience an increase in 
market power that will have anticompetitive effects, the merger may be opposed on antitrust 
grounds (Gaughan, 2011).  
 
Thirdly, diversification happen when one organization acquire one or more organizations that 
are neither exchange partners nor similar organizations competing with each other, but 
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organizations operating in different domains. The extreme form of diversification is the 
conglomerate (Scott, 2003; Gaughan, 2011). Pfeffer argues that mergers involving 
diversification are most likely to occur when exchanges are very concentrated and when 
capital or statutory constraints limit the use of other options for managing interorganizational 
interdependence (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Scott, 2003). 
 
2.3 Merger Research and History 
M&A research represents an interdisciplinary research field with different approaches on 
motives, evaluating and understanding M&A. Corporate history, as well as extensive research 
has shown that M&A are often driven by a complex pattern of motives and reasons, patterns 
that no single research approach can render a full account of. Most of the historical and 
empirical research on M&A has been carried out in the United States. The history of the field 
has been given little attention according to Gaughan (2011), but is nevertheless very relevant 
because of the short memory in the market. American research has demonstrated that patterns 
of mergers tend to reoccur. These patterns can help us understand the reasons and strategies 
for mergers, and help companies identify both opportunities and threats when considering 
merger as a strategy. Research has indicated six merger waves, or periods of high merger 
activity in the United States. They are all characterized by a cyclic activity with high levels of 
mergers followed by periods of lower activity. Merger waves tend to be caused by a 
combination of economic, regulatory and technological shocks to the market (Sherman, 2010; 
Gaughan, 2011). These shocks can therefore explain some of the reasons for mergers, not 
only the merger waves. An economic shock could be an expansion that motivates companies 
to magnify to meet the rapidly growing aggregate demand in the economy. A regulatory 
shock could be the eliminations of barriers and laws that might have prevented corporate 
combinations and cooperation earlier. A technological shock can be a transformation that 
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results in dramatic changes in existing industry or market, and even create new ones 
(Gaughan, 2011; Andrade et al., 2001). Economic theory teaches that mergers occur because 
of efficiency related reasons, synergies, attempts to increase market power, and to take 
advantage of market opportunities (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). However, some of these 
reasons appear to be more relevant in certain time periods. Mergers occur in waves, but 
within a wave mergers strongly cluster by industry. Also, the industries that make each 
merger wave may vary tremendously. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) explain this variation 
with different industry-level shocks. Shocks like technological innovations, supply shocks, 
deregulations, and financial innovations.  
 
2.4 Merger Motives: Growth, Synergies and Management 
The strategic reasons for companies for considering M&A are numerous. From achieving 
economies of scale, reduce risk, to satisfy management and shareholders’ hunger for growth, 
to enter new markets, and the list continues. In this section I will give a broad introduction in 
different motives and strategies for mergers. Firstly, the most common reasons for merging 
are the motives of expansion and growth. External expansion, by acquiring a company in a 
line of business or geographical area in which the company want to expand to, can be quicker 
than internal expansion. An expansion may provide certain synergy benefits, such as when 
two lines of business complement one another. Synergy occurs when the sum of the parts is 
more productive and valuable than the individual components. Financial factors are also vital 
when understanding motives for merging. The value of the acquiring company may be 
significantly increased in market value when merged with the targeted company (Sherman, 
2010; Gaughan, 2011).  
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2.4.1 Growth - internal or external?  
Companies seeking to expand are faced with a choice between internal growth, organic 
growth or growth through M&A. Growth through M&A may be much more rapid than 
internal growth, since companies may grow within their own industries or expand outside 
their business category. Mergers can be an effective and efficient way to enter a new market, 
add a new production line, or increase distribution for a company. If a company seeks to 
expand within its own industry it may conclude that internal growth is not an acceptable 
means of expansion. As a company grows slowly through internal expansion, competitors 
may respond quickly, use a limited window of opportunity, and take market share. 
Advantages of a company may disappear over time because of actions of others, and one 
solution here may be to acquire another company. In many cases, as shown in the research 
presented on merger waves, M&A are driven by a key trend within a given industry. These 
key trends affect the question of internal or external growth. Key trends within an industry 
can be rapidly changing technology, fierce competition, changing consumer preferences, 
pressure on costs control, and a reduction in demand (Sherman, 2010; Gaughan, 2011).  
 
2.4.2 Growth - geographical expansion and internationalization 
Another example of using M&A to facilitate growth is when a company wants to expand to 
another geographical region. A company could already be a national company seeking to gain 
market share in other countries, or seeking market share in other regions within the same 
country. Globalization has forced many companies to explore M&A as a means of developing 
an international presence and expanding their market share (Sherman, 2010). This market 
penetration strategy is often more cost-effective than e.g. trying to build an overseas operation 
from scratch. Therefore, in many instances, it may be quicker and less risky to expand 
geographically through M&A than through internal development. Many deals are therefore 
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driven by the premise that it is less expensive to buy brand loyalty and customer relationships 
than it is to build them. This may be particularly true of international growth, where many 
characteristics are needed to be successful in a new geographic area. The company needs to 
know all of the nuances in the new market, recruit new personnel, and deal with other hurdles 
such as language and law barriers. M&A may therefore be the fastest and lowest risk 
alternatives. Companies that have successful products in one national market may see cross 
border M&A as a way of achieving greater revenues and profits. And a cross-border deal may 
enable an acquirer to utilize the country specific know-how of the target, including its 
indigenous staff and distribution network (Sherman, 2010; Gaughan, 2011). In a study on 
multinational firms and innovations by Castellani and Zanfei (2006) M&A was one of the 
most frequent forms used by multinational companies to expand both their external and 
internal networks and markets. 
 
2.4.3 Management 
Corporate managers are often under constant pressure to demonstrate successful growth, 
especially when the company has achieved growth in the past. When the demand for a 
company’s products or services slows down, it becomes more difficult to continue to grow. 
When this happen, managers often look to M&A as a way to jump-start growth (Gaughan, 
2011). However, managers need to make sure that the growth will generate returns for both 
shareholders and the board. According to Gaughan (2011) there are instances where 
management may be able to continue to generate acceptable returns by keeping a company at 
a given size, but instead choose to pursue aggressive growth through M&A. Some M&A are 
motivated by the need to transform a company’s corporate identity, where the targeted 
company may lead the acquiring company in a new direction or add significantly new 
capabilities (Sherman, 2010). Other M&A may be motivated more by a survival strategy from 
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its managers than by growth. Sometimes companies needs to merge or be acquired in order to 
survive and cut costs efficiently (Sherman, 2010). Another management approach on merger 
motives is the hubris hypothesis, or the pride of the managers. The hypotheses implies that 
manager seek to acquire companies for their own personal motives, and that economic gains 
are not the sole motivation or the primary motivation in the deal (Gaughan, 2011). Improved 
management could also be a motive in M&A deals. Deals can be motivated by a belief that an 
acquiring company’s management can better manage the target’s resources. The acquirer may 
believe that its management skills are such that the value of the acquiring target would rise 
under its control. Gaughan (2011) argues that this improved management argument may have 
particular validity in merger cases with large companies making offers for smaller, 
entrepreneur led, growing companies. The lack of managerial expertise may be a block in a 
growing company, limiting its ability to compete in a broader marketplace. Managerial 
resources are therefor an asset larger firms can offer the targeted firm. 
 
 2.4.4 Synergies 
The key premise of a synergy is that the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts 
(Sherman, 2010). The term synergy refers to “the reactions that occur when two substances 
or factors combine to produce a greater effect than that which the sum of the two operating 
independently could account for” (Gaughan, 2011: 132). Simply stated, synergy refers to the 
phenomenon of 2 + 2 = 5. In mergers this translates into the ability for a corporate 
combination to be more profitable than the individual parts of the combined companies. There 
are two main types of synergy, operating synergy and financial synergy. The latter refers to 
the possibility that combining one or more companies may lower the cost of capital. 
Operating synergy comes in two forms; revenue enhancements and cost reductions. In 
operating synergy, revenue-enhancing synergies may be more difficult to achieve than cost 
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reduction synergies (Gaughan, 2011). There are many potential sources of revenue 
enhancements, and they may vary from deal to deal. They may derive from a sharing of 
market opportunities by cross marketing each merger partner’s products, they may derive 
from a company with a major brand name lending its reputation and status to an upcoming 
product line of a merger partner, and they may derive from a company with a strong 
distribution network merging with a company that has products with potentials but low ability 
to get them to the market before rivals can react. Although the sources for revenue 
enhancement synergies are great, it is often difficult to achieve. Enhancements are difficult to 
quantify and build into valuation models in merger planning. This is why cost-related 
synergies are often highlighted in merger planning, and potential revenue enhancements 
discussed but not clearly defined. As merger planners tend to look for cost-reducing 
synergies, these synergies are often the main source of operational synergies. These cost 
reductions may be a result of economies of scale, the decreasing in per unit cost caused by an 
increase in the size or scale of a company’s operations, or by the need to spread the risk and 
cost of developing new technologies, conduct research, or gaining access to new sources of 
energy (Gaughan, 2011; Sherman, 2010).  
 
2.5 Success and Failure of M&A  
The question of merger success or failure is the central topic of this thesis. By choosing a 
merger that did not get completed, it is obvious that one case can be classified as a failure. It 
is still important to analyse why it did not go through. On the other hand it is equally 
important to understand why the success case chosen in this thesis can be labelled as a 
success. When analysing the success or failure of a merger process it is important to look at 
the motives, strategies and objectives in the pre-merger planning and compare it with the 
results after the merger date. According to earlier research, failures include a lack of adequate 
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planning, an overly aggressive timetable to closing the deal, a lack of looking at possible post-
merger integration problems, and projecting synergies that turn out to be illusory (Sherman, 
2010). A study of managers of acquiring company’s report that 44 % of their acquisitions are 
not living up to the original objectives, and about 70 % of all M&A are reported as failures 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Peng, 2006). Successful M&A are neither an art nor a 
science, but a process. Therefore it is crucial to understand the merger process itself when 
analysing the merger outcome and result. 
 
A transaction as complex as a merger or an acquisition has many potential problems and 
pitfalls. Many of these problems arise in the preliminary stages of the process, such as forcing 
a deal that should not be done, as a result of mistakes, errors, rushed or misleading planning, 
or because the post-merger integration process between the companies becomes a nightmare 
(Sherman, 2010). These pitfalls and problems can undoubtedly become expensive for the 
companies. It is sometimes also difficult to evaluate the anticipated benefits and effects of a 
merger. Potential revenue enhancements are often vaguely referred to as merger benefits, but 
are not clearly quantified in the merger planning. This is one reason some deals fail to 
manifest the anticipated benefits, and the reason could be found in poor pre-merger planning 
(Gaughan, 2011).  
 
The high failure rate of M&A are also caused by the lack of consideration of different factors 
both in the pre-M&A phase and the post-M&A phase (Jones and Miskell, 2007). In the pre-
M&A phase the failures can be traced back into a synergy trap, e.g. when organizations pay 
too much for the targeted firm because of managerial motives or hubris. In the post-M&A 
phase there could be integration problems that also has to be taken into consideration when 
analysing failure. Not just the strategic fit in an M&A has to be achieved, but also the 
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organizational fit, meaning similarity in cultures, systems and structures that will facilitate the 
procedure (Lubatkin, 1983; Peng, 2006). Also the stakeholders’ concerns in the post-M&A 
phase can be a problem, with the fear of losing their jobs, the restructured responsibilities, and 
diminished power. This could all contribute to a M&A failure (Bekier and Shelton, 2002). 
 
The role of human resource departments (HR) also plays a critical role in succeeding with 
M&A. Waight (2004) states that it is not only the financial, economic or commercial factors 
of the M&A that will affect the outcome of the pre-planning, but also the HR-department. A 
detailed merger plan over how the implementation of the M&A should be executed is 
important. The plan should contain elements such as organizational structure, management 
structure, product lines, and business process. The speed of the integration process is also 
considered as a factor of success (Camara and Renjen, 2004). It is important to integrate well, 
but it is also important to integrate quickly. 
 
As opposed to the failures, in the mergers that did succeed, experience and preparations are 
mentioned as key factors. The M&A process has a greater chance of succeeding if the 
organizations and managers have experience from previous M&A. Further, the strategic 
similarities are also mentioned as success factors. The better the strategic fit between the two 
companies, the easier to succeed (Lubatkin, 1983). According to Chapman (2004) the 
screening and pre-planning phase are also critical success factors for M&A. The more 
planning prior to the M&A the better, since the pre-planning phase will affect all areas of 
business and how the integration is handled (Chapman, 2004). Firstbrook (2007) also 
emphasizes the importance of pre-planning in order to reach a strategic fit between companies 
in an M&A. It is important that the M&A-planning has a clear view of the acquired 
company’s role in the strategy after the M&A. Even when a strategy is clear, many companies 
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do not spend enough time to search for companies that will be the best fit for the strategy. 
Often the acquiring company just acquire the first company that looks like a fit (Firstbrook, 
2007). This indicates that the synergies that should have occurred do not occur, due to the 
lack of matching and complementary strategic capabilities between the companies. Strategic 
incompatibilities are likely to be more problematic in some situations than in others. M&A 
that cut across national boundaries are more demanding because of the different nationalities 
involved, and because there is a bigger need for cultural sensitivity in resolving strategic 
incompatibilities (Mayer and Altenborg, 2008). When the merger is also strongly influenced 
by national political considerations, the problem of resolving strategic incompatibilities is 
likely to increase (Bruner, 2005).  
 
Along with the pre-planning and strategic fit of organizations, the organizational fit could also 
inflict the success of a M&A. Organizational fit can be measured by the number of 
organizational adjustments that have to be implemented after the M&A (Castro and 
Uhlenbruck, 1998). Peng (2006) explains organizational fit as similarities in culture, structure 
and systems. He emphasizes the importance of investigating the organizational fit before 
acquiring a company, and organizational fit should be a substantial part of the screening 
process when considering a M&A. However, Peng points out that this is seldom the case. 
Almost 80 % of the acquirers have not done accurate studies on the organizational fit between 
the companies. 
 
Management motives are mentioned as central motives when understanding why M&A occur. 
In understanding factors of success and failure in M&A it could also be useful to look to 
management, as a common problem in M&A could be relational problems (Pablo, 1994). 
Being manager in a company merging with another company and getting a new role could 
	  17	  
create obstacles. If the acquirer is a much larger company than the acquired company, there 
could be power differentials between the companies. The largest company’s managers would 
have more influence, which could lead to the managers from the acquired company feeling 
unwelcome and run over. The acquirer company’s managers could feel pressured to 
implement new orders quickly to meet performance expectation, which could be viewed as 
greater capabilities to enforce their preferences than the other company’s manager. It is not 
only the size differences that matter for the managers but also the beliefs of superiority and 
inferiority between the companies. From being in the core of the organization in one 
company, managers risk reducing their significance in the overall business, ending up with 
less impact, status and power relative to the managers from the other company. One of the 
most important causes of M&A failures are the dominating company’s attitude and beliefs 
about superiority and inferiority towards the other company (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993).  
 
2.5.1 Post-Merger Integration. 
As mentioned above, pre-planning, screening and organizational integration are key concerns 
in succeeding with a merger. There are several important topics when considering the 
integration process. Applying change management in the integrations process, developing a 
shared organizational identity and identification within the new organization, focusing on 
developing a new organization, and competencies are all areas considered critical for the 
achievement of organizational integration (Colman et al., 2011). Firstly, in the change 
management the role of middle mangers becomes important. Top management plays an 
important role in mergers and other large-scale organizational change processes. Most of the 
literature on change management focuses on the role of top management, but in the 
implementation of change a broader set of change agents or middle managers is often 
recognized as crucial for the process. When developing the new organization the design f the 
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organization becomes important. The post-merger design of a new organization is critical for 
the integration. It is through the design of the new organization that decisions are made on 
how to combine the merging parties’ processes, capabilities and resources (Colman et.al 
2011). Colman (2011) argues that the collective side of employee participation and union 
cooperation has been largely ignored in the merger and acquisition literature. She argues that 
these topics are also important for understanding the integration process, especially in a 
Scandinavian context.  
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3. Innovation and Organizational Change 
In this study I want to understand M&A from an innovation point of view before analysing 
successes and failures of mergers. In this chapter I will give an introduction of innovation in a 
theoretical framework, including definitions, the process of innovations and explaining 
organizational innovation. M&A could also represents huge organizational changes, and I will 
therefore also present different frameworks on how we can understand such changes. I have 
selected the resource dependence perspective, and this approach will be thoroughly described 
in this section, along with other approaches on organizational changes. 
 
3.1 Innovation – what is it? 
When exploring mergers from an innovation point of view it is important to define and 
understand the term innovation. There are great variations in the use and understanding of the 
term. In its broadest sense the term comes from the Latin word innovare, which means “to 
make something new” (Tidd and Bessant, 2008: 16). An innovation could be explained as a 
new idea. The idea may be a recombination of old ideas or a unique approach, but is 
perceived as new by the individuals involved. “As long as the idea is perceived as new to the 
people involved, it is an innovation, even though it may appear to others to be an imitation of 
something that exist elsewhere”  (Van de Ven, 1986: 592). Innovation might be seen as “a 
new product, a new process of production, the substitution of a cheaper material newly 
developed, the reorganization of production leading to increased efficiency and lower costs, 
or an improvement in instruments or methods of doing innovations” (Kline and Rosenberg, 
1986: 278-279).  
 
Schumpeter has distinguished between five different types of innovations; “new products, 
new methods of production, new sources of supply, the exploitation of new markets, and new 
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ways to organize business” (Schumpeter, cited in Fagerberg, 2005: 6-7; Fagerberg 2003: 64). 
In organizational research, innovation could also be described as “a process of bringing new, 
problem solving, ideas into use” (Lam, 2005: 123). Mezias and Glynn define innovation as 
“nonroutine, significant, and discontinuous organizational change that embodies a new idea 
that is not consistent with the current concept of the organization’s business” (Mezias and 
Glynn, cited in Lam, 2005: 123). Tidd and Bessant (2008) view innovation on the term as a 
process of turning opportunities into new ideas and of putting these into practice. “Innovation 
is the successful exploitation of new ideas” and “Industrial innovation includes the technical, 
design, manufacturing, management and commercial activities involved in the marketing of a 
new (or improved) product of the first commercial use of a new (or improved) process or 
equipment”. Innovation can also be classified into dimensions like product innovation, 
process innovation, position innovation and paradigm innovation (Tidd and Bessant, 2008: 
16-21). All the definitions above demonstrate how innovation is a complex phenomenon to 
study. It extends from ideas, product innovations to a more management approach. Some of 
these definitions are more useful than others when analyzing the organizational change itself, 
and some of them could also be used to understand the motives for the organizational change. 
 
3.2 Product and Process Innovation 
The ability for organizations to innovate is not a new concern. Organizations have always had 
to think about changing what they offer, and the way they create and deliver that offering if 
they are to survive and grow. As presented in the section above, new or improved products 
are considered to be innovations. Tidd and Bessant (2008) argue that research suggests a 
strong correlation between market performance and new products. New products help capture 
and retain market shares, and also increase profitability in those markets. In cases with more 
developed and established products, competitive sales growth does not simply come from 
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being able to offer low prices, but also from a variety of non-price factors such as design and 
quality. New product development is an important capability of a company because of the 
constantly changing environment. Competitors may introduce new products, thus representing 
a threat to the existing market positions. Legislations and socioeconomic shifts may also 
create both opportunities and constraints. Product innovation is here considered to be a way 
for companies to respond to those shifts. Product innovation can be explained as changes in 
the product and services that an organization offers (Tidd and Bessant, 2008). Both sectors 
and industries in the selected merger cases have an extensive degree of product innovation 
during the last decades, especially the telecom-industry. During the 1990s, the field of mobile 
communication experienced revolutionary changes with new products and services such as 
rapid development of new models and generations of mobile phones, as well as new functions 
and services such as text-messaging and mobile-net development.  
 
While new products are often seen as the cutting edge of innovation in the market place, 
process innovation plays just an important strategic role. Process innovation can be explained 
as changes in the ways in which products and services are created and delivered. Being able 
to make something no one else can, or to do so in ways that are better than anyone else, is a 
powerful source of advantage. Offering better service; e.g. faster, cheaper, higher quality, and 
so on, has long been seen as a competitive source (Tidd and Bessant, 2008). As in product 
innovation, both industries and sectors in this study can be characterized as areas with a high 
level of process innovation. The oil and gas sector, being a fossil fuel energy sector, has been 
facing the threat of extinction of its resources. New technology and production methods had 
to be developed in order to access new reservoirs in order to still provide the sectors main 
products and services. 
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 3.3 The Process of Innovation 
Drucker (1998) explains innovation as a certain kind of activity. He explains innovation as; 
“the effort to create purposeful, focused change in an enterprise’s economic or social 
potential” (Drucker 1998: 3). This definition could help us understand how to manage and 
carry out innovation in a company. The process of innovation is also a complex activity. 
Using a process point of view on innovation and innovation management could help us 
understand why organizations choose to innovate and change. Innovation processes differ in 
many respects according to the economic sector, field of knowledge, type of innovation, 
historical period and country. They also vary with the size of the company, its corporate 
strategies and its experience with innovation. Innovation processes involve the exploration 
and exploitation of opportunities for new or improved products, processes or services, based 
either on an advance in technical practice, a change in market demand, or a combination of 
the two. Since innovation is uncertain, meaning it is impossible to predict the cost and 
performance of it, or the reaction to it, it is useful to investigate the learning processes in 
companies (Pavitt, 2005). 
 
Pavitt (2005) organize innovation into three different and overlapping processes. Each of the 
processes could help explain understand how companies cope with innovation. The first 
process is the production of scientific and technological knowledge. How is the knowledge in 
use produced? A major trend has been the increasingly specialization of scientific and 
technological knowledge-production by discipline, by function and by institution. Here, three 
forms of corporate specialization have developed. The first is the development in large 
manufacturing companies with R&D laboratories specialized in the production of knowledge 
for commercial exploitation. The development of many small companies providing 
continuous improvements in specialized producers’ goods is the second. The third 
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specialization is the changing division of labor between private knowledge developed and 
applied in business, and public knowledge developed by universities or similar institutions. 
The second process of innovation is the translation of knowledge into working artifacts. How 
is the scientific and technological knowledge taken into use? Scientific and technological 
advances enable the creation of artifacts of increasing complexity. These advantages, and the 
increased specialization of production, have reduces the costs of technological search and 
experimentation when transforming the knowledge into products, systems and services. 
Responding to and influencing market demand is the third process on innovation. This 
involves a process of matching products, systems and services with users’ requirements. In a 
competitive system, corporate technological and organizational practices co-evolve with the 
markets. This matching of products, processes, systems and services with actual and potential 
market demand is a major responsibility for innovation managers. Responding to market 
needs and demands involves dealing with disruptive change. This disruptive change interacts 
with one of the negative consequences of specialization; the potential for tribal warfare over 
the old and the new between specialized functions and disciplines within the company (Pavitt, 
2005). 
 
The process of innovation in organizations or firms can also be introduced through four 
different phases in a management process; search, select, implement and capture. This view 
presents innovation as a core process, which needs to be organized and managed, and gives us 
tools for analyzing how different companies and organizations perform. The different phases 
can give answers in how successful innovators acquire and accumulate technical resources 
and managerial capabilities over time, and on how they see innovation as a process that can 
be continuously improved. Searching is about how organizations can find opportunities for 
innovation. Scanning both internal and external environments for threats and opportunities for 
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change are examples of strategies and management in this phase. It is important for successful 
innovation management to have well developed mechanisms for identifying, processing and 
selecting information from the environment. Technological and market monitoring and 
networking can be examples of activities in this phase, and the same is redefining the market 
boundaries of the company. Selecting is about deciding on which of the signals one choose to 
respond to, and which to leave aside. The purpose of this phase is to resolve the inputs into an 
innovation concept, and there are several and different types of inputs in this phase. There can 
be a flow of signals about possible technological and market opportunities available to the 
organization. The inputs can concern the organization’s knowledge base and its competence, 
and inputs can view how opportunities fit with the overall business. In other words, the 
selection criteria are shaped by the organizations specific situation and history. Implementing 
is about turning and translating potential ideas from the environment into reality, for example 
in a new product or service, a change in process, a shift in business model or organization. In 
this phase, research on technology and markets, helps clarify whether or not the innovation is 
possible. The phase has several core elements for analyzing the management of the innovation 
process and its routines. Acquiring knowledge is one of them, and this involves combining 
new and existing knowledge to offer a solution to a problem. This involves generation of 
technological knowledge and technology transfer, and routines for use and management of 
resources in firms. Another element in this phase is how projects are executed in 
organizations, or how innovation is eventually accomplished. Risk-taking and levels of 
uncertainty are key words in this element of the implementing phase. Launching and 
sustaining the innovation are two other elements in this phase. Capturing is about the benefits 
from an innovation process, regardless of this being a commercial success, market share, cost 
reduction or a social innovation. Capturing value is a critical theme, and there are several 
ways to do this. Formal methods like patenting, and less formal methods like the use of tacit 
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knowledge. An inevitable outcome of the launch of an innovation is the creation of new 
stimuli for restarting the process. Re-innovations build upon earlier success, but improve the 
next process of innovation in the organization. Capturing is therefore also about experiences 
and learning, and how to manage the process (Tidd and Bessant, 2008: 19, 55, 79-86). 
 
3.4 Organizational Innovation 
The ability of an organization to innovate is a precondition for the successful utilization of 
inventive resources and new technologies available for the organization (Lam, 2005). 
Conversely, the introduction of new technology often presents complex opportunities and 
challenges for organizations, leading to changes in managerial practices and the emergence of 
new organizational forms. Organizational and technological innovations are therefore 
intertwined, meaning that introduction of new technology often presents challenges and 
opportunities leading to change in managerial practices (Lam, 2005). Schumpeter viewed 
organizational changes as one of the factors of creative destruction. Organizational change 
has been a core concern in organization studies, leading to a broad area of views on what 
needs to be studied and how this should be done (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). The term 
organizational innovation refers to the creation or adoption of an idea or behaviour new to the 
organization (Daft, 1978 and Damanpour, 1996, cited in Lam 2005). Lam (2005) has 
classified the literature and theoretical frameworks on organizational innovation into three 
different approaches; theories of organizational design, theories of organizational cognition 
and learning, and theories of organizational change, adaption and creation of new 
organizational forms. The first approach focuses on the link between structural designs and 
the ability of an organization to innovate. There is a long tradition of investigating the links 
between environment, structures and organizational performance within this approach. 
Several studies have shown how certain organizational structures facilitate the creation of new 
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products and processes, especially in relation to fast-changing environments. The second 
approach focuses on the micro level processes of how organizations develop new ideas for 
problem solving. It emphasizes the cognitive foundations of organizational innovation, which 
is related to the learning and organizational knowledge creation process. This approach gives 
us a micro lens for understanding the capacity of organizations to create and exploit new 
knowledge necessary for innovative activities. The third, and last approach focuses on 
understanding whether organizations can overcome inertia and adapt to radical environmental 
shifts and technological changes. Innovation is considered as a capacity to respond to changes 
in the external environment, and to influence and shape these changes. (Lam 2005: 116-117). 
All three approaches could be useful in understanding organizational innovation and change, 
and to discuss the motives and possible results from organizational changes caused by M&A.  
 
3.4.1 Organizational Structures and Innovation Potentials 
An organization’s structure influences its innovation potential. Studies have shown how 
certain organizational structures facilitate the creation of new products and processes, 
especially in relation to fast changing environments (Lam, 2005). Therefore, the structure of a 
company gives us the possibility to investigate the innovation potential in that company. One 
approach on organizational structure is contingency theory. This approach argues that the best 
structure for an organization is the one that best fits a given operating contingency, such as 
the scale of the operation, the technology or the environment (Lam, 2005). One way to 
understand organizational structure is by using the polar typologies mechanistic and organic 
organizations. Burns and Stalker developed the terms in the late 1950s, explaining how 
differences in technological and market environment affect the structure and innovation 
management in companies. There are several characteristics for the two typologies, 
characteristics that show management structures and practices that can be responses to the 
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environment. It is important to keep in mind that these forms are polar types at the opposite 
ends of a continuum, and that a mixture of both can be found in organizations (Lam 2005). 
 
The mechanistic organization is characterized by a more rigid structure and is to be found in 
more stabile environments. In this organizational form tasks are broken down into specialized, 
functionally differential duties and individual tasks are pursued in an abstract way that is more 
or less distinct from the organization as a whole. The precise definition of rights, obligations, 
and technical methods are attached to roles, and these are translated into responsibilities of a 
functional position. There is a hierarchical structure of control, authority and communication, 
and knowledge of the whole organization is located exclusively at the top of the hierarchy. 
There is also a tendency for interactions between members of the organization to be vertical 
(Lam 2005, Tidd and Bessant 2008). 
 
The organic organization has a much more fluid set of arrangements, and is an appropriate 
form for changing environmental conditions which require emergent and innovative response. 
In this organizational form individuals contribute to the common tasks of the organization and 
there is continual adjustments and redefinitions of individual tasks through interaction with 
others. The organic organization is characterized by a network structure of authority and 
communication, and the direction of communication is lateral rather than vertical. Knowledge 
may be located anywhere in the network, with the ad hoc location becoming the center of 
authority and communication (Lam 2005, Tidd and Bessant 2008). 
 
Another way to understand and analyze organizational structure is by using the organizational 
framework of Mintzberg. He proposed a series of archetypes when describing different types 
of organizations. These provide basic structural configurations of firms operating in different 
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environments. Mintzberg argues that a successful organization designs its structure to match 
its situation and environment. Each of the archetypes have different structure characteristics, 
and innovation potential and implications, and companies are likely to be dominated by one 
of the pure types (Mintzberg, 1979; Lam, 2005; Tidd and Bessant, 2008). There are six 
archetypes listed by Mintzberg; simple structure, machine bureaucracy, divisionalized form, 
professional bureaucracy, adhocracy, and mission oriented.  
 
Mintzberg (1979; cited in Lam, 2005; Tidd and Bessant, 2008) describes the archetypes by 
their characteristics and their innovations potential. The simple structure is characterized as an 
organic type centrally controlled by one person, which can respond quickly to changes in 
environment, i.e. small start-ups in high technology industries. The innovation potential in 
this archetype can be described as entrepreneurial and often highly innovative, continually 
searching in high-risk environments. Weaknesses are the vulnerability to individual 
misjudgment and resource limits on growth.  The machine bureaucracy is characterized as a 
mechanistic organization with a high level of specialization, standardization and centralized 
control. Continuous effort is given to make tasks routines through formalization of worker 
skills and experience. Examples here are the mass production firms. The innovation potential 
in this archetype is low. Firms are designed for efficiency and stability. They are good at 
dealing with routine problems, but highly rigid and unable to cope with novelty of change. 
The divisionalized form is characterized as a decentralized organic form in which quasi-
autonomous entities are loosely coupled together by a central administrative structure. 
Typically associated with larger organizations designed to meet local environment challenges. 
The innovation potential in this archetype is characterized by the ability to concentrate on 
developing competence in specific niches. Weaknesses here include a pull away from central 
research and development towards local efforts, and competitions between divisions. The 
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professional bureaucracy is characterized as a mechanistic form with high degree of 
autonomy to individual professionals. Examples here are universities and hospitals. Individual 
experts being highly innovative within their domain characterize the innovation potential in 
this archetype, but difficulties regarding coordination across functions, domains and 
disciplines impose limits on the innovative capability of the organization as a whole. The 
adhocracy is characterized as a highly flexible project based organization design to deal with 
instability and complexity. Here, problem-solving teams can be rapidly reconfigured in 
response to external changes and markets demands. Examples here are software engineering 
firms. The innovation potential is high, with fast learning and unlearning, highly adaptive, 
flexibility and innovative. Weaknesses here could be lack of control and commitment to the 
project at the expense of the wider organization. The mission-oriented archetype is 
characterized as an organization held together by members sharing common purpose and 
values. Examples here are voluntary and charity organizations. Here, successful innovation 
requires energy and a clearly purpose, and a quest for continuous improvement driven from 
within. Strengths lie in the common purpose and empowerment of individuals to take 
initiatives. Weaknesses lie in overdependence on key persons. 
 
 3.5 The Organizational Environment and the Resource Dependence Perspective 
In this thesis the organizational environments and resources will be used in explaining reasons 
for merging and when analysing the factors of success or failure in the chosen mergers. The 
environmental contexts are fluid and ever changing, and this makes it complicated doing 
research on organizations in light of their environments. Therefore it is central to understand 
the potential role of the environment. Researchers and investigators cannot ignore the effects 
of environments on organizations, and there is little doubt that environment profoundly shape 
organizations, their structures, their performance and their outputs. Over the past decades, 
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organizational studies have expanded both up and out to include higher and wider levels of 
analysis and to encompass more kinds of factors or forces shaping organizations (Scott, 
2003). In several organizational approaches managing task environments becomes a central 
question for organizations. Scott (2003: 197) defines task management as “those features of 
the environment relevant to the organization viewed as a production system, in particular the 
sources of input, markets for outputs, competitors, and regulators”. One of these approaches 
is the resource dependence approach developed by Pfeffer and Salancik.  
 
The underlying premise for this perspective on organizational behaviour and choice is that 
“organizational activities and outcomes are accounted for by the context in which the 
organization is embedded” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 39). In this view the organizational 
environment plays a crucial role in understanding organizations’ choices and actions. They 
explain organizational outcomes with interdependent causes and agents. Interdependence can 
be explained as any event that depends on more than a single causal agent. In social systems 
interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions 
necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the 
action. Therefore, virtually all organizational outcomes are based on interdependent causes or 
agents. Interdependence is a consequence of the nature of organizations, the fact that 
organizations must transact with elements of the environment in order to obtain resources 
necessary for survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that organizations could not survive if they were not 
responsive to the demands from their environments. Organizations engage in exchanges and 
transactions with other organizations and groups. The exchanges may involve monetary or 
physical resources, information or social legitimacy, and because organizations are not self-
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contained or self-sufficient the environment must be relied upon to provide support. To 
continue to provide what the organization needs, the external organizations may demand 
certain actions from the organization in return. It is the organization’s dependence on the 
environment that makes the external control and constraint of organizational behaviour 
possible and almost inevitable. The need to acquire resources creates dependencies between 
organizations and external units. How important and how scarce these resources are 
determines the extent of the dependency (Scott, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
 
In this approach it is assumed that one cannot understand the structure or behaviour of an 
organization without understanding the context it operates in. Here, organizations are viewed 
as active, not passive, in determining their own fate. Organizations and their managers are 
agents, not passive subjects, of selection processes. They scan the relevant environments for 
opportunities and threats, attempting to strike favourable decisions and to avoid costly ones 
(Scott, 2003). Thus the resource dependence approach, view organizations as capable of 
changing, as well as responsive to the environment. Managers manage their environment as 
well as their organizations, and organizations have the ability to intervene in their 
environments (Scott, 2003; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). Management is one way to deal with 
resource dependencies. Innovation is also considered as a way to respond to changes in the 
external environment, and to help the organization to adapt, influence and shape the 
environment through changes (Lam, 2005).  
 
3.6 Other approaches on organizational change, adaption and creation 
How organizations evolve, adapt and change because of their environments can also be 
explained in several other ways. A central debate concerns whether organizations change and 
adapt because of major technological changes and environmental shifts, or whether radical 
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change in organizational forms occur at the population level through a selection process. The 
population ecologist perspective on organizations argues that organizations respond slowly to 
opportunities and threats in the environment because of strong inertial forces (Lam, 2005). 
The institutional perspective on organizations argues that a major source of resistance to 
change rises from the normative embedded values, norms, rules and beliefs within an 
organization (Lam, 2005). In this view, change consists of reproduction and reinforcing the 
existing organization. Evolutionary theories on organization argue that organizations are 
subject to inertial forces because their routines and skills have become difficult to change. In 
this approach organizational change is a product of the search of new practices in the 
neighbourhood of an organization’s existing practices. Changes on skills and routines 
therefore happen slowly and incrementally. The ability for an organization to adapt to changes 
is therefore influenced by the speed at which new competences and skills can be developed to 
match the new demands. This perspective is based on the central premise that organizational 
change is difficult, at least to the pace in which change takes in the external environment 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Lam, 2005). 
 
In contrast to the different approaches on organizational change mentioned above, we have 
the punctuated equilibrium model. This model proposes that organizations are capable of 
initiating revolutionary change during periods of environmental turbulence. This model 
describes organizations as evolving through long periods of stability, equilibrium periods, 
which are punctuated by relative short periods of fundamental change. These revolutionary 
periods involve fast paced, quantum leaps, with most or all key dominants of the 
organizational activity will be involved, e.g. changes in strategy, structure, power distribution, 
and control systems. These periods provide opportunities for organizations to break the grip 
of structural and cultural inertia, and organization are therefore most likely to introduce 
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changes in times of performance crises and shifting environments. Studies have shown that 
fundamental organizational changes occur according to the pattern predicted by this approach 
(Lam, 2005; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). 
 
A third approach in this strand of organizational change is the strategic choice perspective, 
which focuses on the role of managerial action and strategic choice in shaping organizational 
changes. In this view the organizational change is a result of actors’ decisions and learning, 
rather than a result from a passive environmental selection process. Actors are capable of 
redefining and modify structures in ways that opens up possibilities for renewal for the 
companies (Lam, 2005). Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) present a view on strategic 
management through the dynamic capabilities approach. Their view can be used to analyse 
organizational change and management, and organizational performance. The dynamic 
capabilities approach underlines the importance of dynamic change and corporate learning. 
They argue that winners at the marketplace have been the firms and organizations that can 
demonstrate timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation, coupled with 
the management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and external 
competences. The approach emphasizes two aspects, the shifting environment of 
organizations, and the key role of strategic management in adapting, integrating and 
reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, resources and competencies to match 
the requirements in a changing environment (Teece et al., 1997, Tidd and Bessant, 2008). 
These capabilities become strategic assets when they become unique and difficult to replicate 
by others. Such assets could be technological, financial, structural, reputational, institutional, 
and the market structure. Choices about how to invest on different areas are central for a 
strategy. In this approach the choices on gaining competence are highly influenced by past 
choices. Organizations and firms follow a certain path of competence development, a path 
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that defines today’s choices. An organization’s opportunities for learning will often be linked 
to previous activities. By paths they refer to the strategic alternatives available to the 
organization. Where a firm can go is thus a function of its current position and path 
dependency. A strategic challenge is to identify the internal and external competences that are 
difficult to imitate. Competitive advantage can only be achieved if the competences and 
capabilities are based on a collection of routines, skills, and complementary assets, which are 
difficult to imitate for others (Teece et al., 1997). 
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4. Integrating the M&A and innovation literature: General Propositions 
The research question in this thesis asks how to explain the success or failure of mergers. 
M&A have above been presented from a theoretical and literary point of view in chapter 2. 
This, together with the theoretical part on innovation in chapter 3, provides us with a 
framework for analysing M&A. Previous research have seen little interaction between the two 
strands of literature. Much of the existing literature and research on M&A are related to the 
economic performance of companies, or on how companies acquire knowledge, competencies 
and market shares. This thesis seeks to link M&A literature and innovation literature. 
Innovation theories could be used in order to analyse merger motives, merger processes and 
merger outcomes. In this chapter I will propose a new direction of research to combine the 
existing literature on mergers and the innovation literature, by proposing some general 
propositions on merger success and failure. Based on the propositions I will analyse and 
compare the two merger cases in this thesis.  
 
Connecting the literature on M&A and innovation together results in several interesting 
propositions. First, a central question on organizational change is whether it is possible to 
change the organizational structure or archetype and how to do so. The structure of a 
company affects and influences the company’s ability to innovate. Similar companies will 
therefore have analogous capabilities and characteristics. By changing the archetype of an 
organization, it may also change its innovation potential, leading to new possibilities, e.g. new 
products, new markets, new technologies or new organizational forms. Can an organization 
change rapidly by acquiring new technology and competence, or does it require a slow 
process of incremental change within the organization? Also, the structures of the companies 
involved in a merger may affect the organizational fit between the companies. Lack of 
organizational fit could result in an increased need for organizational adjustments and changes 
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in the merger process. For example, a merger between a company described as a machine 
bureaucracy and a company being more of an adhocracy would increase the need for 
adjustments and changes, and therefore complicate the merger. The need for additional 
changes and adjustments could complicate the merger process, and therefore affect the 
success of the deal. 
 
 
 
The structures of organizations give us information on how innovation is carried out in the 
different companies, and it helps to explore the differences and similarities in how the 
companies organize their innovation, and research and development activities. The structure 
can tell us how the companies produce scientific and technological knowledge, and how they 
use this knowledge in their markets and in further development. Since both the cases analysed 
in this thesis are mergers of companies within the same sector or industry, it is likely to expect 
similarities in products, processes, systems and services. The proposition outlined above 
suggests that the more similar the companies are, the more likely the merger will be a success. 
In the presentation of all the companies involved in this study, it will therefore become 
important to investigate any difference or similarity in organizational structure, both in the 
pre-merger phase and in the merger plans. 
 
Another dimension worth highlighting is the external environment of the company. As 
discussed above, in the resource dependence perspective, the organizational environment 
plays a crucial role in understanding organizations’ choices and actions. Similarities in the 
Proposition 1: The more similar the organizational structure of two merging 
companies, the more likely the merger will be successful. 	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external environment could also represent important factors in achieving both organizational 
and strategical fit of the organizations involved. The external environment is also considered 
to be a challenging factor in mergers that cross borders. An example of a difficult merger with 
a low rate of succeeding could therefore be a merger that crosses both nationalities and 
markets.  
 
 
 
The differences in the external environments in the merger cases could help us understand 
both the success case and the failure case involved in this study. It is therefore important to 
examine how contextual and environmental factors such as political, historical, industrial, 
cultural, as well as corporate factors may affect the companies during a merger process. The 
proposition suggests that similar external environments will have a positive impact on the 
success of M&A. And conversely, differences in external environments could help explain a 
merger failure. A negative impact of the external environment could increase the strategic 
incompatibility between the companies, and this is more likely to occur in cross-border 
mergers. Research on international M&A indicates that resolving strategic incompatibility can 
be particularly challenging when there are different nationalities and cultures involved. In the 
selected cases, as discussed in chapter 6 and 7, we have one example each of a cross-border 
merger and a merger within the same country. In both cases, political factors of relevance 
could be the system of governance, and the (political) parties involved in the negotiations on 
behalf of the state or the owners. Cultural factors involved in the selected cases could be the 
corporate cultures in the four companies, different cultures in the two countries involved in 
Proposition 2: The more similar the external environment surrounding two merging 
companies (political, cultural), the more likely the merger will be successful. 	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the failure case, the historical development of the companies and their products and services, 
along with differences in the sectors and industries. In the presentations of the companies, and 
further in the analysis I will therefore look for similarities and differences on such factors. 
 
A third matter of considerable importance is the firm-level strategies involved. Organizational 
analysts often connect strategy with the goals and objectives of an organization. One 
definition of strategy is “the determination of the basic long-range goals and objectives of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals” (Chandler, cited in Scott, 2003; 293). In this thesis the focus will be 
on the strategies of the companies on growth, internationalization, R&D and knowledge 
production, along with management strategies. A firm-level strategy could e.g. be a 
company’s plans for growth and expansion, and how the company wants to achieve those. 
Also, when looking into the R&D-strategies of a company it becomes important to understand 
the knowledge production within the company, the specialization in e.g. technology, markets, 
products and niches. The firm-level strategies involved in the empirical cases in this thesis 
will tell us whether the companies wanted to develop in the same directions or not in the pre-
merger phase, e.g. if they wanted to achieve growth in the same geographical and product 
markets. Similarities and differences in the companies’ strategies before the merger process 
are therefore essential when examining both the strategical fit and organizational fit between 
the merger parties. Similarities in strategies are necessary in order to achieve a good strategic 
fit between the companies.  
 
 
 
Proposition 3: The more similar the firm-level strategies of two merging companies 
(growth, R&D, management), the more likely the merger will be successful. 	  
	  39	  
The proposition suggests that the more similar the companies’ strategies are, the more likely 
the merger will be successful. Since both the merger cases presented in chapter 6 and 7 are 
horizontal mergers with companies within the same sector or industry, it is likely to expect 
some similarities in firm-level strategies, at least in terms of R&D specialization and 
competencies. Different strategies could help us understand a merger failure, and whether one 
of the selected cases is an example of a deal that never should have been suggested. As seen 
in chapter 2.5, failures in M&A can be caused by the lack of consideration of different factors 
in the pre-M&A phase. Management objectives or hubris could therefore also be an important 
firm-level factor in the analysis. 
 
In the theoretical part on mergers it was presented how different motives can lead to M&A. 
Motives such as growth, synergies and management were used to explain why M&A occur. 
These motives could also be linked to the process of innovation, especially in the phases of 
search and select. In chapter 2.5 we saw different explanations on merger success and 
failures. None of them mentioned innovation as a factor, but understanding the drive for 
innovation, change and development is important when looking for factors of M&A success 
or failure. Using the different definitions on innovation we can propose that an organizational 
change could led to an innovation in form of a new idea, the possible exploitation of new 
markets, new sources of knowledge and products, or new possible ways to organize business. 
M&A provide possibilities for massive changes for an organization, but whether M&A lead to 
an innovation depends on the outcome, or the capturing, of the changes. To explain, 
innovation is often driven by the ability to see connections, to spot opportunities and to take 
advantage of them, e.g. capturing market shares. The same arguments could be used on 
M&A. Innovation can also offer new ways of serving established and developed markets, and 
new markets represent a common M&A motive.  
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In order to link more explicitly the innovation literature and M&A literature together, I will 
propose two more specific propositions. Proposition 1 stated that the more similar the 
organizational structure of two merging companies, the more likely the merger will be 
successful. Similarities in organizational structure, or same type of archetypes, require less 
changes in order to achieve a suitable organizational fit in the post-merger phase. This 
indicates that M&A between different organizations and archetypes, each with different set of 
structures and innovation potentials, would complicate the deal and require additional 
organizational changes. I would then expect to find less organizational changes in the success 
case, than in the failure case. It is therefore interesting to investigate any organizational 
change proposed in the merger deal, in merger plans and in the post-merger phase.  
 
 
 
If there are similarities in the organizational structures in the selected merger cases, it is less 
likely there will be additional organizational changes if the mergers would succeed. On the 
other hand, the more different the structures of the merging parties are, the more likely there 
will be a need for further organizational changes to match the two companies, and the more 
likely the merger process will be difficult. As already mentioned under proposition 1, I expect 
to find similarities in products, processes, systems and services in both merger cases, as both 
are mergers of companies within the same sector or industry. If the expectation is correct 
there will be less need for further organizational changes in a successful merger process. 
Allocation decisions on name, management positions, organizational structure and 
Proposition 4: The more similar the organizational structure of two merging 
companies, the less likely there will be further organizational changes during the 
merger process. 	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localization could indicate the level of organizational adjustment needed to ensure a high 
organizational fit. In both cases it will be important to thoroughly investigate if any of the 
expected similarities in structure differs. 
 
Further, it is also interesting to explore the links between M&A and technological innovation. 
In proposition 3 above, I proposed that the more similar the firm-level strategies of merging 
companies, the more likely the merger would be a success. One of the firm-level strategies I 
mentioned was the R&D in the companies. In chapter 3.3 it was shown how innovation could 
be understood as an activity with three different and overlapping processes. The production of 
scientific and technological knowledge, the translation of such knowledge into working 
artefacts, and the response and influence to the market demands. These are three processes 
that could help us understand the outcome of a merger. Similarities in knowledge production 
could also be a part of similarities in products, processes, niches and markets. How do the 
companies choose to produce their knowledge? The trend of increasing specialization of the 
knowledge production by discipline, function and institution, could highlight differences in 
the selected cases. How the companies take their knowledge into use is also an area of great 
interest. Both the merger cases represent industries with a vast scientific and technological 
complexity of products, services and systems. Are there similarities in what products, services 
and systems the companies focus on? Also, the process of how the companies choose to 
respond to the changing market demands is an area of interest. I expect the merging 
companies to have some similarities in all these three processes since they operate within the 
same industries, and therefore also e.g. in similar product markets. Keeping in mind that the 
merger cases are both examples of horizontal mergers, I propose that similarities in R&D 
would create economies of scale in the knowledge production processes. Also, this is likely to 
result in further scientific and technological development within the same markets and niches 
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as before the merger, resulting in deeper and increased incremental innovations in products, 
processes, systems and services. 
 
 
 
If there are similarities in R&D-strategies and competencies it will become important to 
highlight those when introducing the companies and the merger deals. In contrast, if the 
companies have different R&D-strategies and technological competencies, it will lead to a 
widening of the R&D and technological competencies, resulting in more differences in 
product, processes, systems and services. Such differences could possibly lead to more radical 
product and process innovations for the companies in the future. Again, it is important to keep 
in mind that the two selected cases in this study are examples of horizontal mergers. A 
vertical merger with two companies that have e.g. a buyer-seller relationship would be a 
different situation. Companies can undertake vertical mergers in order to incorporate more 
phases of the production or distribution processes. The merging companies in this thesis are 
also related in size. A study by Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) shows how M&A affects both 
small and large companies’ incentives to innovate and conduct R&D. They argue that an 
active M&A market encourages innovation particularly in small companies in an industry, 
and that large firms can outsource R&D to small companies and then acquire those that 
succeed. 
 
 
Proposition 5: If two companies with similar R&D-strategies and technological 
competencies merge, this will lead to an increased pace of technological innovation 
because of higher R&D investments and economies of scale within the same market 
segments.  
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5. Methodological Approach: Case study research 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate factors of merger failure and success. So far I have 
tried to link the merger literature and some theories of innovation. Before discussing the 
empirical cases of the two merger processes, I will present the methodology used in the 
empirical analysis.  
 
5.1 Data 
Evidence in case study research can come from many sources. Yin (2009) discusses six 
complementary sources for collecting case study evidence, and reveals both strengths and 
weaknesses to the different sources. The six sources are documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artefacts.  
 
In this thesis I will use both documentation and archival records. The sources will be reports, 
prospectus and merger plans, earlier research on the merger cases, government papers, annual 
reports and other reports and analysis from the companies I have selected in my study. The 
strengths of documentation as a data source of evidence are that documents are stable, 
meaning documents can be reviewed repeatedly. Documents are unobtrusive; they are not 
created as a result of the case study itself. They are exact and containing exact names, 
references, and details of an event. And documents give a broad coverage of time, events and 
the settings. The weaknesses of documentation as a source of evidence could be the 
retrievability of documents; they can be difficult to find. Accessing the documents is also a 
problem since they may be deliberately withheld for various reasons (Yin, 2009).  
 
Several research projects and reports have been conducted on the Statoil-Hydro merger. After 
the time of the merger, StatoilHydro ASA signed a research agreement with the International 
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Research Institute of Stavanger (IRIS),	  Institute for Research in Economics and Business 
Administration (SNF) and Institute for Labour and Social Research (Fafo), where the 
experiences from the merger and the merger integration process would be documented. The 
research program, named the Merger Integration Trailing Project, lasted three years, from 
2008 to 2010 (www.fafo.no). In the Telenor-Telia case there is also much research done on 
the failed merger attempt, along with merger plans, government papers and other strategic 
documents from the pre-merger time that I will use in the this thesis. I have also used other 
sources in order to get a broad understanding of both cases and in how they were received. I 
then used sources such as parliamentary proceedings, media receptions, articles, initiatives 
and descriptions. The data I have used is presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Case study database: Documents used in Statoil-Hydro and Telenor-Telia3 
Case 1: Statoil-Hydro  
What Description and use 
Storting’s Proposition 60, 
2006-2007: Sammenslåing av 
Statoils og Hydros 
petroliumsaktivitet 
Proposition from the Norwegian parliament. The 
proposition is used as background material, to the 
presentation of the companies and the merger deal, and 
in the analysis. 79 pages.  
Merger Plan StatoilHydro The merger agreement and plan between the companies 
entered into by the boards of directors of Norsk Hydro 
ASA and Statoil ASA on 12 and 13 March 2007 
respectively for subsequent approval by the companies’ 
respective general meetings. Used in describing the 
merger motives and in analysing the merger. The 
merger plan itself consists of 20 pages, but 511 pages 
when including all 14 annexes. 
Merger Prospectus 
StatoilHydro 
A prospectus that provides stakeholders with material 
information about stocks and investments, description of 
the company's business, financial statements, 
biographies of officers and directors, detailed 
information about their compensation, any litigation that 
is taking place, a list of material properties and any 
other material information. The merger prospectus 
provides detailed information about the proposed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Appendix	  A	  for	  how	  to	  access	  the	  documents.	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transactions in the merger plan. Used in presenting and 
analysing the merger. 276 pages, some identical to the 
annexes in the merger plan. 
StatoilHydro’s Annual Report 
2008 
As of 2008 StatoilHydro ceased to publish their annual 
report in printed form, and only published it online. A 
vast range of documents and presentations are available 
at Statoil’s webpages. Used as background material, to 
present the company and in the analysis. The Annual 
Report on Form 20-F consists of 292 pages.  
Statoil’s Annual Report 2007 Used as background material, in presenting the company 
and in the analysis. 246 pages. 
Statoil’s Annual Report 2006 Used as background material, in presenting the company 
and in the analysis. 156 pages. 
Hydro’s Annual Report 2007 Used as background material, in presenting the company 
and in the analysis. 262 pages. 
Hydro’s Annual Report 2006 Used as background material, in presenting the company 
and in the analysis. 246 pages. 
Presentation of Stock Market 
Announcement. 
Used in analysing and describing the merger. 24 slides 
in a PowerPoint-presentation used in the announcement 
18th December 2006. 
Transcript of Stock Market 
Announcement. 
Used in analysing and describing the merger. 3 pages of 
transcription from the announcement 18th December 
2006.  
Book: A merger of Equals? 
The Integration of Statoil and 
Hydro’s Oil and Gas 
Activities. 
Published research project. A research project on the 
integration process in the merger. Based on over 300 
informants from Statoil, and on collaboration between 
different researchers and research institutions. Used as 
background material, in describing the companies and 
the process, and in the analysis part. 302 pages. 
Article: The Merger of Statoil 
and Hydro Oil and Energy. 
Managing the integration 
process. 
Published research article from the Merger Integration 
Trailing Project from SNF. Used in describing the 
integration process. 32 pages. 
Case 2: Telenor-Telia 
 
 
What Description and use 
 
Storting’s Proposition 58, 
1998-1999: Om 
sammenslåingen av Telenor 
AS og Telia AB 
Proposition from the Norwegian parliament. Used as 
background material, in presenting the company and in 
the analysis. Almost 80 pages when including the 
merger deal and the shareholder agreement. 
Riksdagen’s Proposition 99, 
1998-1999: Sammanslagning 
av Telia AB och Telenor AS  
The Swedish government’s report to the parliament. 
Used as background material, in presenting the company 
and in the analysis. Almost 80 pages when including the 
merger deal and the shareholder agreement.  
Storting’s Proposition 59, 
1999-2000: Om avviklingen 
av sammenslåingen av 
Telenor AS og Telia AB 
Proposition from the Norwegian parliament. Used as 
background material and in the analysis. 20 pages. 
Telenor’s Annual Report Used as background material, in presenting the company 
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1999 and in the analysis. 126 pages. 
Telenor’s Annual Report 
1998 
Used as background material, in presenting the company 
and in the analysis. 110 pages. 
Telia’s Annual Report 1999 Used as background material, in presenting the company 
and in the analysis. 56 pages.  
Telia’s Annual Report 1998 Used as background material, in presenting the company 
and in the analysis. 51 pages. 
Telenor-Telia Press Release 
19th January 1999 
Press release on the merger intentions. Used in 
analysing and describing the merger. 2 pages. 
Telenor-Telia Press Release 
31th March 1999 
Press release on the merger agreement. Used in 
analysing and describing the merger. 2 pages. 
Telenor Press Release 16th 
December 
Press release on reversing the merger. Used in analysing 
and describing the merger. 1 page. 
Book: Interessekonflikt, 
kommunikasjonssvikt og 
kulturkollisjon. En studie av 
fusjonen mellom Telia og 
Telenor. 
Published research project on the failed merger, from 
Rokkansenteret University of Bergen. Used as 
background material and in analysing the merger 
attempt. Almost 200 pages. 
Article: Why did the Telia-
Telenor merger fail?  
Published research article in International Business 
Review. Used in the analysis. 22 pages. 
Article: Incompatible 
strategies in international 
mergers: the failed merger 
between Telia and Telenor 
Published research article in Journal of International 
Business. Based on participant observation in real 
merger time, over 25 interviews with top and middle 
management, and on internal documents. Used in the 
analysis. 19 pages. 
 
 5.4.1 Document and Text Analysis 
Documents are a rich source of data in this thesis. It is therefore important to know how to use 
documents and texts in research. Texts serve three purposes in the process of qualitative 
research; they are essential data on which the findings are based upon, they are the basis of 
interpretations and thirdly the central medium for presenting and communicate the research 
(Flick, 2002). Documentary sources of data may be used in several ways in research, and the 
sources can consist of a wide range of different types of documents. Several questions appear 
when collecting and using such sources of data: its authenticity – whether it is original and 
genuine; its credibility – whether it is accurate; its representativeness – whether it is 
representative of the totality of documents of its class; and its meaning – what it is intended to 
say (Jupp, cited in Punch, 2005: 185). When analysing such data several other questions and 
concerns arise. First, how did the document come into being and how was it made? All 
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documentary sources are the result of human activity, produced on the basis of certain ideas, 
theories or commonly accepted, taken-for-granted principles, and these are always located 
within the constraints of particular social, historical or administrative conditions and 
structures. Documents and texts need to be understood in their social and institutional setting.  
A second concern is the social organization of the document. How are documents written? 
Who writes them? Who reads them? And for what purpose? How are they read? What do 
readers need to know to make sense of them? A third concern is the direct analysis of 
meaning, including questions of truth and error. This part of the analysis can focus on the 
surface or the literal meaning, or on the deeper meaning in documents and texts. A fourth 
question is the application of different theoretical approaches to the analysis of texts and 
documents (Punch, 2005). 
 
Krippendorff (2004) elaborates several features of texts that are relevant in understanding and 
using texts in research. First, texts have no objectives, there is no reader-independent 
qualities. Second, texts do not have single meanings that could be identified, described or 
found for what they are. Third, the meanings invoked by texts need not to be shared. Fourth, 
meanings speak to something other than the given text. Fifth, texts have meanings relative to 
particular context, discourses or purposes. And the last feature is the nature of texts, that 
demands that analysts draw specific inferences from a body of texts to their chosen context. 
 
Translated into my study, all this becomes important for the documents and texts used and 
several questions arise. What are the differences that we need to take into consideration 
between e.g. government papers and corporate reports? What do we need to know about the 
time period or the contexts to better understand the production and meaning of the 
documents? The documents and the use of them are described in Table 1, but that does not 
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give any guarantee for how to understand the documents. For example, propositions and 
annual reports are different types of documents. Propositions form the basis for the 
parliaments’ consideration of proposed resolutions, new legislation or amendments to 
legislation, the budget, or other matters that require a decision by the parliaments. An annual 
report is a complete report on a company's activities throughout the preceding year. Annual 
reports are intended to give shareholders and other interested people information about the 
company's activities and performance. It is important to keep such differences in mind when 
using the documents in research. 
 
Researchers should use different methods for the research tasks for which it is best suited, and 
use alternative methods to compensate for the limitations of different approaches. Which 
method chosen to answer the research question with is determined with the help of the 
formulation of the research question itself, the purpose of the research, the empirical data, and 
the amount of time and resources available for the research (Andersen, 94). This thesis is 
based on case study research. Case study research is used in many situations to contribute to 
our knowledge of individual or organizational phenomena. In this thesis case study research 
will be used to gain in depth knowledge on both mergers as a phenomenon, and on the two 
selected merger cases to study factors of success and failure. I have chosen this 
methodological approach for several reasons. First, in case studies, it is a clear advantage that 
the researcher can choose between different sources of evidence. Second, this type of research 
method makes it possible to link two areas that lack a clear connection in the literature, 
namely M&A (performance) and innovation. 
 
Doing a multiple-case design with two cases makes case-comparison possible. The method 
could also be used to create new hypotheses about mergers as phenomena and on explaining 
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the merger outcomes. Multiple-case designs have distinct advantages and disadvantages in 
comparison to single-case designs. The evidence from multiple-case designs is often 
considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust. 
But the rationale for single-case designs cannot be satisfied by multiple cases, and the conduct 
of a multiple-case study can require more resources and time than a single-case design (Yin, 
2009). 
 
Case study research has particular advantages in answering certain kinds of questions (George 
and Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) describes case studies as the preferred strategy 
when how and why questions are being posed, and when the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context. George and Bennett (2005:17) define a case as 
“an instance of a class of events”. The term class of events refers here to a phenomenon of 
scientific interest. Yin (2009: 18) gives a twofold, technical explanation of case studies. First, 
a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life context. Second, the case study inquiry relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, benefiting from prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.   
 
There is potential for confusion among the terms comparative methods, case study methods 
and qualitative methods. The comparative method, the use of comparisons among a small 
number of cases, is distinct from the single-case study method, which involves only the 
internal examination of single cases. The term qualitative method is sometimes used to 
encompass both case studies and comparative methods. George and Bennett (2005) describe 
case study methods to include both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of a 
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small number of cases, since there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing 
inferences from case studies is the use of a combination. 
 
5.2 Strengths of case study methods. 
George and Bennett (2005) identify four advantages of case methods that make them valuable 
in testing hypotheses and useful for theory development: their potential for achieving high 
conceptual validity; their strong procedures for developing new hypotheses; their value as a 
useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of 
individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity. Firstly, case studies 
allow researchers to achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or to identify and measure the 
indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure. Many 
of the variables that interest social scientists are difficult to measure, thus researchers must 
carry out contextualized comparison which self-consciously seeks to address the issue of 
equivalence be searching for analytically equivalent phenomena across different contexts.  
 
Whereas statistical studies run the risk of “conceptual stretching” by lumping 
together dissimilar cases to get a larger sample, case studies allow for 
conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a smaller number 
of cases (Ibid: 20).  
 
Therefore, statistical research is frequently preceded by case study research to identify 
relevant variables, followed by case study work that focuses on deviant cases and further 
refines concepts. Secondly, case studies have advantages in the heuristic identification of new 
variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the course of 
fieldwork, such as archival research and interviews. If a researcher asks one question of 
individuals or documents but gets an entirely different answer than expected, the researcher 
may move on to develop new theories that can be tested through previously unexamined 
evidence. Thirdly, case studies examine the operation of causal mechanisms in individual 
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cases in detail. Within a single case, researchers can look at a large number of intervening 
variables and inductively observe any unexpected aspects of the operation of a particular 
causal mechanism or help identify what conditions present in a case activate the causal 
mechanism. Lastly, case studies have the ability to accommodate complex causal relations 
such as interactions effects and path dependency (George and Bennett, 2005: 19-22)  
 
5.3 Limitations, trade-offs and potential pitfalls of case studies. 
It is important to distinguish among limits, trade-offs and examples of poor implementation of 
case study methods, and not to misinterpret these aspects through the prism and techniques of 
statistical methods (George and Bennett, 2005). Limitations include a relative inability to 
render judgement on the frequency or representativeness of particular cases and a weak 
capability for estimating the average causal effect of variables for a sample. Trade-offs 
include the problem of case selection, the trade-off between parsimony and richness, and the 
related tension between achieving high internal validity and good explanations of particular 
cases versus making generalizations that apply to broad populations. The problem of case 
selection bias. In contrast to statistical researchers, case study researchers sometimes 
deliberately choose cases that share a particular outcome. Selection of cases on the basis of 
the value of their dependent variable is appropriate for some purposes, but not for others. On 
the other hand, cases selected on the dependent variable can help identify which variables are 
not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome. Making tentative conclusions. 
A limitation of case studies is that they can make only tentative conclusions on how much 
graduations of a particular variable affect the outcome in a particular case or how much they 
generally contribute to the outcome in a class or type of cases. In other words, a case study 
remains much stronger in assessing whether or how a variable mattered to the outcome than 
assessing how much it mattered. The “degrees of freedom”-problem” is also applicable in 
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case studies. This term is the statistical term for the broader issue of under-determination, or 
the potential inability to discriminate between competing explanations on the basis of the 
evidence. In statistical studies, degrees of freedom are crucial because they determine the 
power of a particular research design. In case studies there might be a freedom problem 
caused by less variables, both dependent and independent. Case studies receive criticism 
because of their lack of representativeness. Case study researchers do not aspire to select 
cases that are directly representative from populations, and they usually do not make claims 
that their findings are applicable to the populations. Statistical researchers devote much time 
and effort in trying to make the samples as representative as possible. In case studies this is 
difficult and sometimes counterproductive. Here, case study methods involve a trade-off 
among the goals of attaining theoretical parsimony, establishing explanatory richness, and 
keeping the number of cases to be studied manageable. Another criticism towards case studies 
is the lack of independence of cases. This issue concerns whether cases are independent of 
one another. There is a danger that the researcher will fail to identify a lack of independence 
between cases and will consequently reach false conclusions. This issue depends on the 
research objectives, theories and hypotheses in use, and how the comparison of cases is 
structured. However, a lack of independence of cases is useful to test whether results from an 
earlier case played a crucial role in a later one (George and Bennett 2005; Yin, 2009).  E.g. in 
a case study on mergers it could be useful to study any former mergers in all the companies’ 
histories. 
 
5.4 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability and validity are two criteria used to examine a research method. Reliability 
considers the dependability of the data used in the research, and one goal of reliability is to 
minimize errors and biases in a study (Punch, 2005; Yin, 2009). In a research method 
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consistency and stability over time are important aspects. Usually expressed in the following 
question: “if the same instruments were given to the same people, under the same 
circumstances, but at a different time, to what extent would they get the same scores?” 
(Punch, 2005: 95). The same result would indicate that the measuring instruments and 
technics are reliable.  Therefore, in a case study the objective is to be sure that, if a later 
investigator followed the same procedures as described by an earlier researcher and conducted 
the same case study all over again, the later investigator should get the same results. In order 
to do so it is important to document the procedures followed in the study. One of the tactics in 
case study research to secure reliability is the development of a case study database (Yin, 
2009). Yin argues that every case study should strive to develop a presentable database, so 
that other investigators can review the evidence directly and not be limited to the written case 
study reports. Many documents will be collected and used in a case study, and the use of these 
documents should be covered. One way to do so is to have an annotated bibliography of these 
documents, crating a database for the study. The main objective is to make the documents 
retrievable for later inspection and research. Replicability is the most important form of 
reliability (Krippendorff, 2004). Transferred to this study it means that all the documents in 
use and how they were retrieved will need to be documented. Table 1 and appendix A 
constitutes this study’s database. 
 
Validity, the other criteria has several dimensions and meanings in social research. The 
validity of data considers how well the data represent the phenomena for which they stand. 
Overall validity of the research is about the research as a whole, and refers to the extent to 
which the different elements of a study fit together. Validity can be divided into three 
different dimensions or tests; construct, internal and external validity. Construct validity 
refers to the operational measures for the concepts being studied. Internal validity is about the 
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study’s research design, whether it is a true reflection of the reality studied. External validity 
refers to the generalizability of the study’s findings and results. The question here is how far 
the findings can be transferred to other settings (Punch, 2005; Yin, 2009).  
 
Yin (2009) considers the three dimensions to be three different tests for the research method 
and design in use. The first test, construct validity, is considered to be especially challenging 
in case studies, because of the problem of developing a sufficient operational set of measures. 
To meet the test of construct validity it is important to define the subject of research in terms 
of specific concepts, and identify operational measures that match the concepts. Also, 
different tactics are available to increase the construct validity in case studies. First, the use of 
multiple sources of evidence in the data collection contributes to increased construct validity. 
A second tactic is to establish a chain of evidence in the data collection and the study. In my 
study I have emphasized the use of a large number of, and different kinds of documents in the 
research.  
 
Internal validity is mainly a concern for explanatory case studies, when a researcher is trying 
to explain why and how events led to other events. If a researcher concludes with a causal 
relationship between events without knowing whether other events caused the result, the 
research design has failed to deal with the threat to internal validity. Another concern here is 
the problem of making inferences. A case study involves an inference every time an event 
cannot be directly observed, and therefore it is important to question the inferences. 
Explanation building, addressing rival explanations, and using logic models are different 
tactics in addressing internal validity (Yin, 2009). Therefore, in this study it will be important 
to address other explanations and inferences than those given from earlier research or the 
analysis part of the thesis. 
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External validity, the generalizability of the study is considered as a great barrier when doing 
case studies. However, it is here important to distinguish between statistical generalization 
and analytical generalization. In case studies the latter one could be used to generalize 
particular results to some broader theory (Yin, 2009). In this study it will be impossible to 
make generalizations on M&A based on the two selected cases. However, the study provides 
new hypothesis or propositions (chapter 4) on similar M&A that may possibly have more 
general validity. 
 
5.5 Limitations and Concerns  
The lack of further sources of evidence could represent a possible limitation of this thesis. The 
broad set of documents in use is no guarantee that other sources could not have given more 
insight on the studied cases. In general, there is a concern for the potential overreliance on 
documents as a source of evidence in case studies. As viewed in the chapters above, when 
using documents as a source of evidence it is important to remember that all the documents 
were written for some specific purpose and readers other than a case study. Therefore, in this 
study it is important to be aware of how the documents and text were produced and originally 
used. The same goes for the archival records used in the study. Furthermore, whether the 
research is set in context could also represent a concern. Are the cases and the literature well 
connected? Meaning that the literature on M&A, innovation and organizational change need 
to be connected with the chosen cases. 
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6. A Case of Successful Merger: Statoil-Hydro 
On December 18th 2006 the merger of the oil and gas companies of Statoil and Hydro, the two 
Norwegian industrial giants, was announced. In a Norwegian context this merger represented 
a historical event of great societal, industrial and organizational importance. The new 
company would include a total of 31 000 employees, with 5000 from the former Hydro and 
26 000 from Statoil, and the merger involved approximately 85 percent of all activities on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. In an international setting it involved operations in almost 40 
countries. At the time, both Statoil and Hydro held globally recognized technological 
competence in the oil and gas sector (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07; Merger Prospectus, 
2007; Colman et al., 2011).  
 
On October 1th 2007 Statoil and the oil and energy activities from Hydro were merged into 
the new company StatoilHydro ASA. Statoil shareholders would own 67,3 percent and Hydro 
shareholders 32,7 percent in the merged company, and the Norwegian government would own 
62,5 percent of the stock in the merged company (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07; Merger 
Prospectus, 2007).  
 
6.1 Statoil and Hydro – Strategies, Structures and the External Environments 
At the time of the merger, Statoil was already the largest company working on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf, and being located in 34 countries the company was also a huge 
international oil and gas company. Statoil was established as a state-owned oil company in 
1972 with the purpose of, alone or in joint action with other oil companies, to assure 
Norwegian participation from the beginning of domestic shelf production to build the 
necessary expertise to form a national oil industry. The goal was to engage in exploration, 
production, transportation, refining and marketing of petroleum and derivative products, and 
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other activities (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07). Statoil became a national, industrial and 
political project from the start, and the company became central in the economic development 
of Norway. When the first oil exploration in the North Sea took place in 1960s, it was the 
international oil companies that initiated it. It was therefore assumed that the foreign 
companies, such as Esso and Shell, would develop the activities on the Shelf if any oil 
reservoirs would be found. But in the late 1960s and the early 1970s the political opinion 
turned in favour of national and governmental control over the activities, and several 
committees concluded that much needed national expertise and competencies would be 
secured with a national company, and Statoil was established (Falkum and Tharaldsen, 2011). 
By 1981 Statoil was the first Norwegian oil company to acquire operator privileges on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (Szumilas and Stensaker, 2009). The 1990s were characterised 
by intense technological innovation on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, with Statoil 
becoming a leading company within floating production facilities and subsea developments. 
Statoil grew strongly and expanded in product markets (Statoil’s Annual Report, 2006; 
Engen, 2009). The development of the Norwegian oil and gas exploration has been very 
successful, and it has often been referred to as an oil adventure. As a result, Statoil became an 
important and powerful actor in the development of Norway, but not quite as powerful in an 
international setting. For Statoil to become a stronger international company, it was partly 
privatized and introduced on the stock exchange for further growth. In 2001, the Norwegian 
Parliament Stortinget decided a stock market listing of the company, and also allowing for 
new owners to own a third of the company. Several attempts were made to merge Statoil and 
Hydro during the last decades, and the idea was to assemble the expertise and capacities 
needed to operate in international markets (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07; Falkum and 
Tharaldsen, 2011). 
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Statoil’s head office was located in Stavanger, but the company also had activities otherwise 
in Norway, in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Harstad and Hammerfest. In 2006 the organizational 
structure of the company consisted of five business areas: exploration and production in 
Norway, international exploration and production, natural gas, manufacturing and marketing, 
and technology and projects (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07; Statoil’s Annual Report 
2006). The organizational structure is shown in figure 1. In 2006 the strategic goals of Statoil 
were several. Firstly, the company wanted to maintain the role of leading player on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. Secondly, Statoil wanted to develop new international 
platforms. Thirdly, Statoil wanted to strengthen their position in pipeline and liquefied natural 
gas value chains. Fourthly, increase value creation in the product market. Fifthly, be world 
leading in project execution and in selected technology areas (Statoil’s Annual Report, 2006).    
 
Figure 1: Organization Chart of Statoil 20064
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separated from the company. At the time of the merger, Hydro was the second largest oil and 
gas company on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, only beaten by Statoil. The company had 
become an important actor in the exploration of oil and gas in Norway and internationally, 
and had growth ambitions in both domestic and international markets (Storting’s Proposition 
60, 2006-07). Hydro played an important role in the modernization of Norway. Norsk Hydro 
Aktiekvælstofselskab was established in in 1905 as a private company based on producing 
nitrogen-based fertilizers, and from early on the company sought to enter the aluminium 
industry. This was the beginning of a long industrial development within agricultural and 
metal products. The Norwegian government acquired part ownership in the company from 
1945, and in 1971 the government extended its ownership into the majority shareholding. The 
reason for the majority shareholding was national oil-politic motives and perspectives. The 
shareholding was reduced from 51 % to 43,8 % in 1999 (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07; 
Falkum and Tharaldsen, 2011). Hydro started its oil and gas activities in 1963, and was part 
of the first oil discovery on the Norwegian Shelf in 1969. Hydro was also a major stakeholder 
in a second Norwegian oil company established at the start of the Norwegian oil adventure, 
Saga Petroleum. In the 1980s Hydro acquired its own productions blocks and developed its 
own oil and gas division (Falkum and Tharaldsen, 2011). Despite its growth and successes 
over the decades, the millennium marked a new beginning for Hydro as the company started 
reducing its range of activities by demerging its fertilizer and industrial gas businesses into an 
independent company, Yara International (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07; Szumilas and 
Stensaker, 2009). At the turn of the century the company was based upon three pillars; oil and 
energy, aluminium and fertilizers, and the company’s strategy was to become a Norwegian-
based international company in all three pillars. Other business areas were phased out, and 
Hydro acquired other companies in the core business areas. After the divesting of the fertilizer 
business, the company concentrated on the two areas remaining.  
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In 2006 the strategic aims for Hydro was to further develop the business areas of energy and 
aluminium. The main challenges were to increase the oil and gas reserves and improve the 
profitability in the aluminium business. Hydro was determined to strengthen their 
international oil business and their position in the European energy market. Another aim of 
the company’s strategy was to develop the next generation of aluminium production capacity 
(Hydro’s Annual Report, 2006). Looking deeper into the strategies of the Oil & Energy 
division in the company provides a further operationalization of the strategies involved. 
Firstly, in exploration and production Hydro intended to secure long-term growth in oil and 
gas business by exploiting its core competencies in exploration, project design, project 
execution and operations. Secondly, the company wanted to deliver strong production growth 
based on a broad portfolio of well-defined and profitable projects. Thirdly, to build the basis 
for future long term-term productions by pursue the optimal development and exploitation of 
the existing portfolio. Fourthly, Hydro wanted to capture the opportunities on the Shelf 
through technological advances and innovative field development solutions. Lastly, the 
company wanted to continue to pursue cost improvements in production and exploration 
activities (Hydro’s Annual Report, 2006). The merger with Statoil would give Hydro the 
possibility to concentrate on one core business area, the aluminium business, in which the 
company already was a strong, global, integrated aluminium company (Storting’s Proposition 
60, 2006-07). The organizational structure of Hydro Oil & Energy is presented in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Organizational Chart of Hydro Oil & Energy 20065 
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or their final development had been planned. The problem was not lack of new discoveries, 
but rather a tendency for new discoveries to be smaller and less accessible than previous 
fields and reservoirs. And in addition, the new discoveries contained more natural gas than 
oil. However, two conditions provided optimism for the oil and gas industry in Norway. First, 
new technologies and simpler construction methods were being deployed, enabling operating-
cost reductions at almost 30 %. Second, the opening of exploration and development of oil 
and gas activities in the northern Norwegian Sea provided new opportunities. Because of the 
new discoveries and the concern over high costs of exploration and development, the public 
founding of petroleum research increased during the late 1990s. Also, new intern-
organizational models were gradually implemented to accompany the new technological 
development. The development was accompanied by a significant consolidation of the 
industry. Statoil and Hydro divided the smaller Norwegian oil company, Saga Petroleum, 
between them, achieving control of the production on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(Engen, 2009; Falkum and Tharaldsen, 2011). 
 
The internationalization of the Norwegian petroleum industry marked a new era. In 1990 
Statoil and British Petroleum (BP) formed an alliance, which focused on exploration and 
production in the former Soviet Union, Angola, Nigeria, China and Vietnam. The alliance 
was dissolved in 1999, but Statoil had intensified their effort to be established on the 
international arena with the acquisition of the Irish oil company Aran in 1995 (Engen, 2009). 
In 2006, in response to increasing competition in access to resources in the international oil 
and gas industry, Statoil and Hydro, independently of one another, engaged in a strategic 
review of their growth strategy and their competitive environment with a goal to enhance their 
respective competitive positions internationally (Merger Prospectus, 2007). At this time, both 
companies had a strategy of internationalization, and in 2006 Hydro Oil & Energy joined 
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Statoil when they tried to gain access to oilfields in Venezuela and capture a large share in the 
Russian field Stockman. Both the initiatives failed, but the strategies of competing on the 
international arena contributed to the merger the following year (Engen, 2009).   
 
6.2 Merger Motives and the Merger Plan  
As seen in chapter 2, companies merge based on a variety of reasons, such as access to 
competencies, resources and market shares, as well as internationalization. Some mergers are 
merely motivated by cost reduction through restructuring and downsizing, or other synergy 
effects, and some are motivated purely by management motives. In the Statoil-Hydro case the 
merger was driven by several motives. The objective for the merged company was to be a 
competitive global participant in the petroleum industry, and to become the world’s largest 
operator for offshore projects in water depths of more than 100 meters. The merged company 
would have a greater ability than each of the companies alone to secure further growth in an 
environment with increasing competition for new resources, and increasing technical 
complexity in available projects (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07; Statoil-Hydro Merger 
Plan, 2007). The merger can be characterized as a horizontal merger of two former 
competitors motivated by a goal of international growth, more efficient operations 
internationally, scale-based efficiencies and expansion into new markets.  
 
The scale economies would create a stronger possibility to pursue the international growth 
ambitions because of the joint forces in technological, operational and financial assets. The 
scale efficiencies would therefore be essential in the strengthened competition on accessing 
new oil and gas resources (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07). Accessing and exploring new 
oil and gas reservoirs on the Norwegian Continental Shelf had become more and more 
difficult the last decades. Statoil and Hydro anticipated that the combined company would 
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have a better ability to explore, develop and produce oil and gas in technically demanding 
areas of the Norwegian Continental Shelf in the future. The required technology changes 
constantly, and therefore by combining the technological skills and knowledge of the two 
companies the merger would stimulate faster development and greater use of new innovative 
technologies. This would strengthen the company's position as one of the world's leading 
technology-driven oil and gas companies (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07).  
 
The new size of the company and the workforce would create a company better equipped for 
the future. By developing and combining the companies' total workforce of about 31,000 
people, including 20,000 in exploration and exploitation, the combined company would be 
better prepared future challenges. The oil and gas industry faced significant challenges in 
securing the necessary expertise in the years ahead. The merger would result in a company 
with greater human capital, project execution capability and operator expertise both at home 
and internationally. The technological expertise the companies had built the last 40 years 
would make the combined company internationally competitive (Storting’s Proposition 60, 
2006-07). As one of the world’s largest companies in petroleum production in deep water, the 
new company would be a more attractive customer for the supply and service industry. In the 
long term the merger would create more efficient use of resources and reduced costs in supply 
and services in use. The size and the combined forces would also be better equipped in terms 
of meeting the growing demand for renewable energy (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07).  
 
Other synergies were also an important motive in the merger. It was expected that the merger 
would contribute to significant cost-reductions through increased efficiency in the 
exploration, development and production phases. Internal resources would be transferred to 
other activities and areas of growth. The merger synergies were expected to continue over 
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time to lead to more revenue for the combined company than for the two companies 
separately through more efficient use of limited resources in relation to drilling and well 
activities, increased exploitation, integrated operations, management and international 
experience (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07).  
 
Geographical proximity is also mentioned as one of the motives for the merger. The activities 
of the two companies, both at the Norwegian Continental Shelf and in the world, are 
overlapping.	  And by combining the two companies' international production and development 
portfolio, the combined company would benefit from a broader global presence. The new 
company would therefore strengthen its position in several areas, such as the Gulf of Mexico, 
West Africa and North Africa. It would hold a diversified portfolio of future development 
projects, and Statoil and Hydro viewed the geographical spread of the merged company's oil 
and gas production of strategic importance in order to develop their combined reserves on a 
medium and long term (Storting’s Proposition 60, 2006-07).  
 
Helge Lund, President and CEO of Statoil stated the following in connection with the 
announcement of the deal: 
“The time is right for a strong Norwegian-based energy champion. We are 
creating a stronger and more competitive company. Combing the best of both 
organizations, we will significantly improve our competitive position 
internationally and promote long-term vitality of the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf” (Stock market announcement Dec.18 2006).  
 
The following statement from the Statoil and Hydro boards of directors can summarize the 
ambitions and motives behind the merger.  
“Statoil’s and Norsk Hydro’s boards of directors each believe that the 
combination of Statoil with Hydro Petroleum will create a Norwegian-based 
international oil and gas company that will be a more forceful international 
competitor than either Statoil or Hydro Petroleum would be on its own, with 
greater capabilities to accelerate growth, respond to the challenging 
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competitive landscape of the energy industry and deliver long-term value to 
shareholders” (Merger Prospectus, 2007: i). 
 
6.3 The New Company and the Integration Process 
As seen in chapter 3, the integration process plays a crucial role for the success in a merger. In 
the Statoil-Hydro merger the strategies and objectives communicated at the announcement of 
the merger, on combining the best from both, signaled a tight integration. Although there 
were obvious size differences between the companies, and unequal size on share holdings, the 
companies chose to announce the merger as a merger of equals (Colman et al., 2011). This 
implies a complete combination and equality of the premerger unit´s organizations, processes 
and resources. So why announce this merger as a merger of equals? Both the CEOs 
emphasized the importance of equality in the merger integration process.  
“We did it to create a new company (…) that was stronger than each of us 
alone. That is why we were concerned with equality – that one party did not 
take over the other. It was not an acquisition where one party dictated the 
contingencies. (…) We agreed that it was a merger” (Eivind Reitan, former 
CEO of Hydro, in Colman et al. 2011: 18). 
  
“The merger represented a large change for both organizations, and I wanted 
to create the right tone in the merger from day one. My concern was to make 
sure that our people experienced through our communication and leadership 
actions that this was a merger of equals. Even though financial I think most 
people would characterize this as a takeover by Statoil of Hydro, in financial 
terminology. But for me that was uninteresting, because we would not be 
measured on the terminology, but on what we managed to create together in 
the new company” (Helge Lund, CEO Statoil, in Colman et al. 2011:18).  
 
These two statements imply the fact that the size difference between the two companies was 
substantial, and that it was not likely the merger would be perceived as a merger between 
equals unless an effort was made. 
 
This effort resulted in several decisions based on combining the best from both. Despite the 
focus on equality, the early decisions tended to favour Statoil. The top management appealed 
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to a pragmatic approach towards the equality based on the rationale of the overachieving 
principles of safe and efficient operations and business as usual (Colman et al., 2011). In the 
negotiations of the merger deal, some of the allocation decisions and management decisions 
were made. This included who would take the position as CEO and the position as chairman 
in the new company, with the CEO coming from Statoil and chairman from former Hydro. It 
was also decided that Statoil’s governance system and structure would be the chosen system 
and structure for the new company (Merger Plan, 2007; Colman et al., 2011). Statoil would be 
the surviving entity in the merger. The name of the new company would be StatoilHydro 
ASA, but the board of directors in the merged company were in charge of developing a new 
name and a new logo. The new name should symbolize the merged company’s strategies, 
values and visions, and it was decided that that it should be different from the two existing 
companies’ names6 (Merger Plan, 2007; Merger Prospectus, 2007). On locations it was 
decided that the registered office of the merged company should be in Stavanger. Corporate 
functions should be located in both Oslo and Stavanger, and the CEO should have offices in 
both locations. Further, the CEO of the merged company would be Helge Lund, and the board 
of directors should consist of ten members; three from the employees, four nominated by the 
election committee of Statoil, two nominated by the election committee of Hydro, and Eivind 
Reitan from Hydro as chairman (Merger Plan, 2007). Decisions that were made after closing 
the deal included the remaining top management positions, localizations of activities and the 
staffing. In general, these remaining allocation decisions followed a principle of equality, 
either understood as 50/50 or as a proportional equality. The recent often interpreted as 1/3 to 
Hydro and 2/3 to Statoil, e.g. the top management team consisted of six managers from Statoil 
and three managers from Hydro (Colman et al., 2011).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  In 2009 the merged company changed its name from StatoilHydro to Statoil ASA, and did not follow the 
original agreement.	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Figure 3. Post-merger organizational chart of StatoilHydro ASA7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  StatoilHydro’s Annual Report 2008	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7. A Case of Failed Merger: Telenor-Telia 
On 20th January 1999, the two leading and largest, state-owned telecom companies in Norway 
and Sweden announced their intention to merge into a new telecom company (Telenor Press 
Release 19th January 1999; Mayer and Altenborg, 2008; Neby, 2003). The new company, 
Newtel AB8, was set to become one of the strongest telecom companies in Europe. The 
boards stated that the merger would make the new company stronger and more robust in 
competition with the larger market players, and the deal involved almost 23 500 employees 
from Telenor and 30 500 employees from Telia (Telenor’s Annual Report, 1999; Telia’s 
Annual Report, 1999). The merger announcement was well received by both analyst and the 
press. The Financial Times claimed that the merger would be a jewel of communication, and 
claimed this marked a new era for the telecom sector in Europe (Meyer and Altenborg, 2008). 
However, eleven months after the announcement, in December 1999, the merger was 
cancelled, and Telia and Telenor voluntary dissolved the merged company (Neby, 2003; 
Telenor Annual Report, 1999). This outcome was surprising, as the two companies were 
initially regarded as a good match for several reasons. First, the two companies had 
dominating positions in the telecom markets in their own countries, and economic analysts 
viewed this relatedness in markets as very favourable. Both companies were present in the 
same product markets, and they were both ahead of their competitors in the mobile, fixed and 
Internet markets. Also, the companies had similar historical backgrounds, being former 
monopolists in a regulated regime. They faced similar competitive challenges defending the 
strong position, and in changing their strategies to survive in a deregulated market (Storting’s 
Proposition 58, 1998-99; Meyer and Altenborg, 2008). The merger can be characterized as a 
horizontal merger of two similar companies motivated by a goal of growth, synergies in scale 
efficiencies, and national-political ambitions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The new company did not get any official name, but the name Newtel AB is used in correspondence between 
Telia and Telenor and in government papers.	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7.1 Telia and Telenor – Strategies, Structures and the External Environments. 
In 1999, Telia’s goal was to be the leading telecom company in the Nordic and Baltic region, 
both in the fixed net and in new business areas such as mobile and Internet. The company was 
a strong actor in sale and development of fixed net, both in Europe and between Europe and 
US  (Telia’s Annual Report, 1999; Riksdag’s Proposition 99, 1998-99). Telia originates from 
a role as a state owned telecom company. The Swedish Televerket had been in charge of 
developing and operating telecom services in Sweden for a long time. It started with the first 
telegraph line back in 1853, and developed along with the changes in demands and 
technology. In 1993 the company became a corporation when Telia AB was founded. 
Televerket/Telia was a central actor in the vast technological development in the 1980s and 
1990s. The company has always been closely related to the Swedish companies in the telecom 
hardware-manufacturing sector, especially to Ericsson, in developing, testing and producing 
technology and services in the telecom sector. In 1997, Telia became the first foreign 
company that was permitted full access to the American telecom markets, and overseas 
communication was an important strategy area for the company (Neby, 2003). At the time of 
the merger attempt the company had several strategies for its business areas and markets. 
Firstly, the company wanted to maintain its position in the Nordic and Baltic region as the 
leading telecom firm. Secondly, they wanted to increase the efficiency in production and 
distribution in the Swedish market. Thirdly, to become the leading alternative telecom 
company in all the Nordic countries. Fourthly, invest and develop the infrastructures and 
services in the Baltic countries to prepare for increased competition. Fifthly, to expand in 
Russia and the Baltic areas with the help of a Nordic partner. And lastly, to secure a global 
distribution capacity based on the strength of the company and strategic partnerships (Telia’s 
Annual Report, 1998). Functions and the different business areas influenced the 
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organizational structure of Telia in the pre-merger time. The enterprise was divided into eight 
business areas and three market areas. Several corporate service units supported the business 
areas and the markets. The organizational structure of Telia is presented in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Organizational structure of Telia 19989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telenor’s goal in 1999 was to remain the leading telecom, IT and media company in Norway, 
with the aim of further development for becoming an international telecom company 
(Storting’s Proposition 58, 1998-99; Telenor’s Annual Report, 1998). At the time, Telenor 
was the only company in Norway that provided a wide range of telecom services. Telenor’s 
history dates back to 1855, and it is quite similar to Telia’s. Both were state owned and they 
both shaped the telecom development of the two countries. Den Norske 
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  9	  Telia’s Annual Report 1998; Storting’s Proposition 58, 1998-99	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company, and in 1994 the firm became a public corporation named Telenor (Neby, 2003). As 
with Telia, the changes in technologies also changed the company’s activities and operations 
several times during its history. In the 1990s the Norwegian telecom market was deregulated, 
and Televerket lost its monopoly in selling telecom services (Neby, 2003). In 1998 Telenor 
consisted of the overall company Telenor AS and several subsidiary and autonomous 
companies. While the structure of Telia is explained with the functions and the business areas 
of the company, the structure of Telenor reflects how the company was involved in several 
different niches and markets. The organizational structure of the company is presented in 
figure 5. The strategy of Telenor could be described by the overall ambitions and the 
strategies in the subsidiary companies. In 1998 the company had an aggressive 
internationalization plan, especially in the mobile market, and the company also wanted to 
defend and maintain its position in the Norwegian market by developing new products and 
services (Telenor’s Annual Report, 1998). By exploring the strategies of Telenor International 
AS, one of the autonomous subsidiary companies, it is possible to further uncover its main 
strategies. The international approach was to develop profitable businesses in chosen areas of 
competencies to increase the company’s position in the international market. The company 
was involved as owner in several mobile companies around the world, and the goal was to 
develop an international business alone or in joint action with others. Telenor was involved in 
projects in mobile communication in Germany, Austria, Russia, Bangladesh, Hungary and 
Ireland, and had a strategy of further growth in Western Europe, Central Europe, Russia and 
South East Asia (Telenor’s Annual Report, 1998).  
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Figure 5: Organization Chart of Telenor 199810 
 
 
The two Governments and the systems involved in the merger attempt are important parts of 
the contexts and the external environments for this merger case. Not only did they negotiate 
the merger deal as owners of the companies, but they were also responsible for informing, 
involving and getting the final approval from the two Parliaments involved (Neby, 2003). 
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10 Telenor’s Annual Report 1998, Proposition 58, 1998-99 
11 Today named Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications.	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in how the systems handle accountability for the Government in political cases. In Sweden it 
is more common to have a joint responsibility within the Government, while in Norway it is 
more common with a higher accountability for the Minister involved (Christensen et.al, 
2002). These political factors could have influenced the merger process because of the high 
level of governmental involvement and considerations. The actions and opinions of the 
involved politicians could have influenced the merger process, and contributed to the national 
battle in allocation and localization questions.  
 
There are also other contextual elements that need to be taken into consideration when 
understanding the failed merger attempt. First, the historical relationship between Norway and 
Sweden could help analyse the merger case. Sweden and Norway were in a union from 1813 
to 1905. Sweden was the superior power in this union, and from the start the Norwegians 
struggled for power, influence and autonomy. It is reasonable to believe that historical events 
and emotions could influence future relationships. Second, slightly differences in cultures 
could also be an important external factor when analysing the merger process. Third, 
differences in how to respond to shifts and opportunities could help the analysis. At the time 
of the merger attempt the telecom sector had seen a rapidly, on-going technological 
development, and deregulation and globalization provided new markets and opportunities 
(Neby, 2003). How the companies chose to respond to the development and these 
opportunities could reveal similarities and differences in the pre-merger phase. 
 
7.2 Merger Motives and the Course of Events 
The two companies started the initiative to merge already in the autumn of 1997, and 
negotiated with and without representatives from the two Governments involved in the 
following years. Business related questions were negotiated at top management level from 
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both companies, and ownership and other strategic questions were negotiated between the 
Norwegian and the Swedish Governments (Neby, 2003). Early on the two companies joined 
into an agreement on further development and strategies because of the merger initiative and 
process. When entering the agreement on 30th Mars 1999, Telenor and Telia were prevented 
from carrying out independently, in what is referred to in the agreement as strategic 
transactions, including the acquisition and disposal of operations, reorganisation and major 
joint ventures with third parties, until the merger was completed (Telenor’s Annual Report, 
1999). The companies were permitted to develop new strategic initiatives jointly, but were 
required to exercise caution because of an undecided approval of the merger by the EU 
Commission. 
 
As seen in the chapter 2, and in the presentation of the Statoil-Hydro merger, there are several 
potential motives behind a merger. A merger between Telenor and Telia was considered 
important in order to meet the rapid development in the telecom sector, with a high pace of 
technological and structural changes. Both the Norwegian and the Swedish Governments 
wanted to maintain a strong telecom company within a national context, securing a 
nationwide offer of modern telecom services at low prices. Establishing a strong Nordic 
telecom company would give the size and competitiveness that would insure the governments 
on these issues. The merged company would create cost efficiency and other synergies for its 
owners, create a stronger base for innovation and development, along with the enhanced 
possibilities of expansion into new markets (Storting’s Proposition 58, 1998-99, Riksdag’s 
Proposition 99, 1998-99).  
 
The merger motives are also explained by the deregulation in the telecom sector, with 
increased competition both in the national and international markets (Storting’s Proposition 
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58, 1998-99; Riksdag’s Proposition 99, 1998-99). In a press release from the day of the 
announcement of the agreement, the business strategies and goals for the merged company are 
summarized:  
To utilise the company’s world leading competence, primarily in the areas of 
mobile communication, satellites and the Internet, for international expansion, 
primarily in Europe, but also globally. To increase the profitability of the 
established Scandinavian activities through further development and 
continued efficiency improvement. To develop the company’s international 
business activities, primarily in the Baltic region and the rest of Europe 
(Telenor-Telia Press Release March 31th 1999). 
 
However, the merger with all its possibilities for growth and synergies did not happen. A 
decision over location started the final break between the negotiating parties. At Newtel’s 
board meeting on December 8th 1999, the President and CEOs’ proposal for the location of 
the business areas' head offices was under consideration. The Swedish chairman of the board 
made it clear that he would use his casting vote to ensure that the Swedish proposal to locate 
the mobile operations in Sweden was adopted. Referring to the voting rules in the 
shareholders agreement, the Norwegian members of the board gave a clear warning of their 
opposition to this course of action. However, the Swedish board members rejected this. The 
Norwegian board members immediately had an official entry recorded in the minutes stating 
that the decision had been made in contravention of the voting rules in the shareholders' 
agreement (Neby, 2003; Telenor’s Annual Report, 1999). After an evaluation with the two 
Governments involved, the deal was eventually cancelled.  
“For everyone involved – the two countries governments and the two 
companies – the conditions for a businesslike successful merger have been 
mutual respect and equality between the two parties carrying out the merger. 
When one of the parties clearly demonstrates that these conditions are no 
longer decisive, then unfortunately the whole basis for the merger is gone” 
(Tormod Hermansen, CEO Telenor, cited in Telenor’s press release December 
16th 1999).  
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Table 2: Course of events in the Telenor-Telia merger 
Date Event 
September 1997 CEO of Telenor and CEO of Telia start talks on cooperation 
between the companies. 
The Swedish Minister of Trade and Industry starts search for 
partners for Telia 
November 1997 The Norwegian Minister for Transport and Communications is 
informed about the conversations on a possible merger between 
Telia and Telenor. 
Political/government negotiations for cooperation starts  
January 1998 The Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications informs 
Telenor that they do not wish to proceed with the merger 
negotiations.  
Stortinget forces the government to continue the negotiations.  
February 1998 The Swedish Minister of Trade and Industry announced that the 
deal was off. 
March 1998 The two companies resume merger talks at top management level. 
Summer 1998 Secret meetings between Telenor and Telia are been carried out.  
November 1998 The political negotiations are reopened.  
January 1999 The Swedish and Norwegian Ministers announce the intention to 
merge Telenor and Telia through the agreement of intentions. 
The new agreement replaces all the earlier agreements.  
March 1999 The merger agreement is signed.  
Announcement of top management team and localisations 
postponed. 
April 1999 Announcement of top management team.  
Announcement of localisations postponed for second time.  
June 1999 The business units present their business plans to the top 
management team. 
Board members are appointed. 
October 1999 The EU Commission approves the merger on conditions. 
The shareholder agreement is signed. 
December 1999 Telia sell its Norwegian telecom operations to Norwegian Enitel. 
The Swedish chairman of the board uses his casting vote in the 
decision to localise the mobile business area to Sweden. 
The deal is broken off. 
 
7.3 The New Company and the Merger Agreements 
Telenor-Telia’s overall strategy was to expand internationally to become a leading actor in 
telecommunications and information services in northern Europe and globally, and to expand 
in other areas where the company could develop advantages of competition and competence. 
The company was expected to increase the profitability in the Nordic region through changes 
in efficiency and by using its advantages of competence; distribution of communication 
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services, research and development of the fixed net based on future technologies, an 
increasing penetration of current and new markets, development of new services and a 
geographical expansion. The business portfolio could be summarized in three areas of 
activity: the fixed communication services in the Nordic area; established and new areas of 
growth; and international investments through ownership and knowledge transfer (Storting’s 
Proposition 58, 1998-99; Fang et al., 2004). 
 
The intention agreement from January 1999 contained an ownership agreement in favour of 
the Swedish side of a 60/40 relation (Storting’s Proposition 58, 1998-99; Fang et al., 2004; 
Neby, 2003).  The 60/40-relation was a result of valuations, a due diligence, and negotiations 
between the parties. Equality between the parties became an important issue in all rounds of 
negotiations, but the question of ownership was not solved through equal shares. During the 
time of the negotiations there were several agreements with different sets of issues addressed. 
Three essential principles underlie all the agreements of the merger. First, the merger and the 
management of the new company were to be based on equal influence. Second the merged 
company should be partially privatized and stock market listed. And third, the new company 
should have a commercial and financial facility that will form the basis for a long-term 
industrial cooperation. The first principal on equality and power balance was superior to the 
rest of the principles, and in the merger and shareholder agreement this was reflected in 
several ways. Firstly, the governments should have equal votes in the general assembly. 
Secondly, the governments should have equal rights in appointing the same number of 
members of the board. Thirdly, the position as chairman should rotate between the parties. 
Fourthly, the Norwegian government was given the right to appoint the first CEO in the new 
company, and the Swedish government was given the right to appoint the two first deputy 
CEOs. Lastly, the head office for the new company was to be located in Sweden, and the 
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international centre was to be located in Norway. Further, the locating and managing the rest 
of the activities should be based on commercial principles and the integration principles 
according to the agreement (Storting’s Proposition 58, 1998-99).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Textbox 2: Factors of failure in the Telenor-Telia merger: -­‐ Different organizational structure -­‐ Different organizational strategies on international growth and 
development in the pre-merger phase -­‐ Different priorities in the mobile and fixed market and development in 
the pre-merger phase -­‐ Different nationalities, languages and cultures -­‐ Different political environments and actors -­‐ Different strategies on R&D and innovation -­‐ Lacking geographical proximity in foreign activities -­‐ Principle of equality resulted in several postponements of allocation 
and localization decisions, resulting in the lack of the ability to make 
decisions during the negotiating process 
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8. Discussion and Comparison of the two Cases 
Chapter 4 presented five different propositions when integrating the M&A literature and the 
innovation literature. After presenting the involved companies, their structures, strategies, 
external environments, merger plans and course of events, it is now possible to illustrate the 
validity of the propositions with the empirical findings.  
 
Proposition 1 suggested that the more similar the structures of the companies, the more likely 
the merger will be a success. In the case of Statoil-Hydro the structures can be described as 
similar. The similarities in structure between Statoil and Hydro are presented in figure 1 and 
figure 2. Both companies can be characterized as divisionalized companies. The figures show 
how the companies have similarities in business areas and in how they produce scientific and 
technological knowledge. In the negotiations of the merger deal the structure of Statoil was 
chosen, and as shown in figure 3, few changes were needed. Based on this, it is fair to claim 
that Statoil and Hydro achieved a high organizational fit. In the case of Telia and Telenor, 
there were several differences in the organizational structures. Figure 5 shows Telenor as a 
highly divisionalized company with autonomous subsidiary companies in different niches and 
markets. Figure 4 shows Telia as a less divisionalized company focused on different business 
areas and functions, with surrounding support units. The lack of organizational fit makes the 
merger more difficult to conduct, and therefore contributed to the failure. 
 
Proposition 2 suggested that the more similar the external environment surrounding the two 
merging companies, the more likely the merger would be a success. In the Statoil-Hydro case 
the companies shared similar cultures, identities and history. Both Statoil and Hydro operated 
in the North Sea, giving the employees and managers from the two merger parties a shared 
history as important actors in the development and operation of the Norwegian oil and gas 
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exploration and production. By this, I mean they had met the same risks and challenges, used 
the same technologies, developed similar knowledge and skills, and followed the same rules 
and regulations. The two companies also shared the same political context. They had the same 
owner in the Norwegian Government, and had experienced the different shifts in political 
fluctuations. Before and after the first oil exploitation in the 1960s the Norwegian 
Government decided to develop national expertise in geology, physics, engineering, 
economics and law, in order to develop the oil industry as a national project. Both companies 
took part in developing systems for research and further development within the industry. 
Telenor and Telia also shared similar external environments in form of cultures and history. 
The companies were regarded as a good match for many reasons, especially because of the 
shared historical development of the companies. The companies had dominating positions in 
their country, both were ahead of their competitors in the mobile, fixed net and Internet 
markets, both had similar historical backgrounds as former monopolists, and they both faced 
competitive challenges in the new deregulated markets. Politically, the companies shared both 
similarities and differences. They were both state owned companies from similar governance 
systems, but had slightly differences in how the governments conducted their ownership. In 
the cross-cultural management literature, Sweden and Norway are ranked as similar cultures. 
Fang (et al., 2004) list several reasons why the culture became a problem in this particular 
merger process. First, one reason could be the lack of preparation on both sides due to the 
perceived similarities between the two countries in national culture, corporate culture, and 
language. Second, the differences between Norway and Sweden also concerned the trade 
unions. In Sweden, the trade unions have had a stronger position in relation to management, 
probably more powerful than in Norway. Third, incidents occurred during the negotiation 
process that aroused a strong nationalistic sentiment on the Norwegian side, which pulled the 
merger into the historical rivalry between Sweden and Norway. 
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Proposition 3 suggested that the more similar the companies’ strategies are, the more likely 
the merger will be a success. For example, to realize synergies the merging parties need to 
agree on how the combined resources will be deployed in the merged company. If the 
merging parties have different and divergent strategies on how the combined resources can be 
best combined, then their strategies are incompatible, and the more likely the merger will be a 
failure. Both cases represent mergers of companies with complementary resources, but also 
two different views on how to combine these resources. In the case of Statoil-Hydro the 
companies had developed similar strategic priorities before the merger. They had both 
adopted a strategy of international and domestic growth, and they had both experienced the 
need to develop new technologies and production processes in order to maintain their 
production and profitability. The consolidation strategy of Hydro suited the Statoil’s strategies 
for growth and increased value creation in the product markets. The synergies and efficiencies 
described in the merger plan could confirm the strategic fit between the companies.  
 
In the case of Telia and Telenor, the two companies had embraced some different strategic 
priorities before the merger attempt. The development of the strategies in Telenor and Telia 
can be traced back to how the two companies chose to respond to the technological change 
and deregulation of the telecom market in the early 1990s (Meyer and Altenborg, 2008). In 
Telenor a substantial part of the company was separated from the regulated market to prepare 
for a more competitive market. New ventures were spun off into autonomous entities, giving 
business managers a large degree of control over their own business. Also, Telenor made 
different acquisitions in new areas such as information technology. The implication of this 
strategy was that Telenor at the time of the merger attempt was the centre of innovations in 
telecom in Norway. The innovations were either acquired through M&A or happened in-
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house. In Telia, the strategy was highly influenced by their largest business, the fixed net 
(Mayer and Altenborg, 2008, Neby, 2003). The fixed net was the historical basis for Telia’s 
growth, and was the main central business unit in Telia. Telia’s strategy was to use their 
strong position in the fixed net in the domestic market to take on a stronger positions in 
neighbouring countries, and to become one of the world’s leading operators in the fixed net in 
Europe and the US. Telenor had an expansion plan based upon the company’s mobile and 
Internet divisions, and had expanded its mobile business into the Far East, Russia and Eastern 
Europe. The plan was to continue this strategy. Also, at the time of the merger Telenor had 
plans to establish a stronger position in the Nordic market. In their study of the failed merger, 
Mayer and Altenborg (2008) found that both Telenor and Telia were critical and sceptical to 
the growth strategies of their merging partner. Telenor saw little potential in international 
expansion in the fixed markets, and Telia doubted the strategy of expansion in Russia and the 
Far East.  
 
However, both companies shared the ambitions to expand in the Nordic mobile markets. 
Another example of different strategies in the two companies is the innovation strategies 
involved. Telia’s management believed that innovation should be managed from the centre of 
the company, implying a single dominant logic, and that the fixed net should be revitalised 
through new technological innovations. Telia also had the benefits of being located in a strong 
cluster of telecom activities in Kista, Sweden. A location where Ericsson, at the time one of 
the world’s leading telecom hardware producer, was also located. The close relationship to 
Ericsson was important to Telia, and it was considered as a strong centre for innovation. In 
Telenor the innovations happened in-house within the business units that were separated from 
the regulated business, implying a diverse logic to innovations. Telenor also acquired 
innovations through M&A (Mayer and Altenborg, 2008). Research on international M&A 
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indicates that resolving strategic incompatibility can be particularly challenging when there 
are different nationalities involved. The Telenor-Telia case confirmed this as the companies 
lost confidence in one another, and in how they failed to reach key decisions because they 
were locked into national battles on location and strategic choices. 
 
Management could also have contributed to both the success case and the failure case. Based 
on this thesis it is difficult to analyse whether hubris played an important role in the merger 
motives. However, it is possible to describe how the management dealt with the merger 
processes. Both mergers were presented as mergers of equals, with different understanding of 
the equality principles. Announcing a merger as a merger of equals elicits expectations from 
the different stakeholders. The implementation of a merger implies the reassignment and 
redistribution of resources, authority and responsibilities between individuals and between 
units. It was likely that conflicts of interest would occur, leading one of the involving partners 
to perceive the process as not equal. The announcement of a merger of equals sends strong 
signals of balance and equality, both to the merger process and its outcome. It also sets the 
stage for a difficult post-merger balancing act, with high expectations of equality that would 
not exist if the merger was announced in a different way. In the case of Statoil-Hydro the 
equality principle was not absolute, but also relative to the different size of the merging 
parties. The early integration and allocation decisions in the Statoil-Hydro case did not appear 
to elicit feelings of imbalance or inequality among management, managers or employees 
(Colman et al., 2011). In the case of Telenor-Telia the principle of equality led to both 
political and management disagreements. One analysis of the breakdown of the merger might 
be that representatives of Sweden, through their actions, showed that they regarded Norway 
as neither an equal player nor a telecom nation. In their study of the Telenor-Telia case, 
Mayer and Altenborg (2008) found that the forces resisting integration and hindering 
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operationalization of the strategic intent of the merger were located at the top. They observed 
how the positive spirit of integration deteriorated, particularly in the top management and the 
board of directors, whereas the middle management played a much more constructive role in 
translating the strategic intent into new business strategies. It is also interesting to ask whether 
Telenor was the preferred merging partner for Telia. Before entering into the merger attempt 
with Telenor, Telia had come a long way in discussing merger plans with Sonera, the major 
telecom company in Finland. After the merger breakdown and cancellation, Telia merged 
with Sonera in 2002. 
 
Proposition 4 suggested that the more similar the organizational structure of two merging 
companies, the less likely there will be further organizational changes during the merger 
process. As already shown above the organizational structure of Statoil and Hydro were 
similar, and both companies could be described as divisionalized companies. Further, as 
shown in chapter 6.2 and 6.3, some of the decisions that affect the need for further 
organizational changes in the merger process were taken during the negotiations. Decisions 
such as who to appoint as CEO and chairman, the adaption of Statoil’s organizational 
structure, the name of the new company, a geographical balance in localization, and the 
decision to use a pragmatic approach to the equality principle during the rest of the merger 
process. In the case of Telia and Telenor we have seen the differences in structures, and how 
these differences could be explained. Telenor’s structure is organized towards the independent 
subsidiary companies in different niches and markets, and Telia’s structure towards functions 
and business areas. As shown in table 2, several of the allocation decisions in the merger 
attempt were postponed time after time. A great problem for Telia and Telenor was that there 
was no overriding mechanism for resolving issues where the parties had incompatible views. 
None of the parties became strong enough to overcome this problem. The equality principle 
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also contributed to this problem. The equal balance and equal representation and voting 
procedures implied that there was no overriding resolution mechanism. In the case of Telia 
and Telenor it is reasonable to conclude that several organizational changes would have been 
necessary to conduct the merger, if it had been successful.   
 
Proposition 5 argued that if two companies with similar R&D-strategies and technological 
competencies merge, it will lead to an increased pace of technological innovation because of 
higher R&D-investments and economies of scale. In the case of Statoil-Hydro the R&D-
expenditure increased from NOK 1.97 billion in 2007 to NOK 2.24 billion in 2008 
(StatoilHydro’s Annual Report, 2008). StatoilHydro also reported that the company had 
delivered half of the identified merger synergies by the end of 2008, and summarized 2008 
with a strong operational performance. It appears that some of the anticipated synergies were 
realized soon after the merger. The anticipated synergies mentioned in chapter 6.2 were e.g. 
economies of scale and other scale efficiencies because of the joint forces in technological 
and operational forces.  Other synergies mentioned were the company’s total combined 
workforce, size and expertise. The combined forces resulted in a company better equipped in 
order to meet the demands and challenges in the oil and energy sector. Cost-reductions were 
also mentioned as an anticipated synergy in the merger, and a more efficient use of resources 
in relation to exploration and development were listed. A suggested future research could be 
to analyse the pace of the technological innovation and other synergies in Statoil-Hydro in a 
long-term perspective.  
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9. Conclusions  
This thesis has investigated the factors that explain merger success and failure by making an 
attempt to link more explicitly the literature on M&A and the literature on technological and 
organizational innovation. The work has proposed some general propositions on how to study 
the outcome of a merger, and then compared the success case of the merger between Statoil 
and Hydro with the failed merger between Telenor and Telia.  
 
Chapter 2 has presented the literature on M&A through different definitions, descriptions of 
different types of mergers and merger motives. The latter can be summarized by the three 
main factors of growth, synergies and management objectives. Different approaches and 
research on the success and merger failure were also presented in chapter 2. Motives, 
strategies, the pre-merger planning and the post-merger integration are examples of success 
factors that are often highlighted in the literature. Chapter 3 has presented a summary of some 
relevant theories on innovation and organizational change. The chapter has introduced 
innovation through definitions of the phenomena, by distinguishing between product and 
process innovation, and by exploring the process of innovation from different approaches. 
Organizational innovation has then been presented by pointing to the literature on 
organizational structures and their innovation potentials. Chapter 3 has also provided a 
framework on how to understand organizational changes by means of the organizational 
environments and resources, namely the resource dependence perspective. The main premise 
for this approach is that organizational activities and outcomes are accounted for by the 
context in which the organization is embedded. Chapter 4 has made an attempt to draw 
insights from the innovation literature for the study of mergers. By proposing five general 
propositions (or hypotheses), the chapter has tried to propose a new direction of research. 
These propositions focus on how organizational structures, external environments, and firm-
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level strategies may affect the result of a merger. Chapter 5 has then presented the 
methodological approach used in the empirical analysis of the two cases. The presentation of 
the data and the case study database are two important aspects of this chapter. Further, the 
chapter has also discussed some important aspects of document and text analysis, strengths 
and limitations of case studies, reliability and validity of the thesis, and some thoughts on 
limitations and concerns for the thesis. Chapter 6 has described the success case of the merger 
between Statoil and Hydro, and chapter 7 the failed case of the merger between Telenor and 
Telia. Here, the companies’ strategies, structures and external environments have been 
described, along with the merger negotiations, motives, plans, negotiations and the integration 
process. Chapter 8 has then discussed and compared the results of the two cases in the light of 
the theoretical propositions outlined in chapter 4. 
 
The main result of this comparative study is that several factors contributed to the success of 
the first case. The companies Statoil and Hydro had similar organizational structures and 
similar business strategies on R&D and international growth in the pre-merger phase. The 
firms also developed in the same historical contexts, with the same political environments and 
actors. The two companies also shared the same motives when entering the merger process, 
and could therefore set up a detailed plan of the anticipated synergies in terms of efficiencies 
and cost-reductions. The pre-merger planning and the ability to take decisions during the 
negotiations resulted in a prepared integration process in the post-merger phase. Statoil and 
Hydro also shared a geographical proximity in both their national and international activities. 
 
In the second case, the merger attempt between Telenor and Telia, the empirical evidence 
suggests that several factors contributed to the merger breakdown. Telenor and Telia had 
developed in different countries and business cultures. The differences in political 
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environment and actors contributed to lock the merger process in national battles. 
Furthermore, the two companies had different organizational structures, and different business 
strategies on international growth and development in the pre-merger phase. For example, the 
companies differed at that time in terms of their different focus on the developments of 
mobile and fixed telephony market respectively. Different strategies on R&D and innovation 
are two other important factors. The two companies also lacked geographical proximity in 
their foreign activities before the merger attempt. During the negotiations for the merger, the 
principle of equality resulted in several postponements of allocation and localization 
decisions, resulting in the lack of ability to make conclusive decisions. 
 
As previously outlined, besides explaining the different outcomes of these two merging cases, 
this thesis has made an effort to point out some more general propositions that may be useful 
to link more explicitly the merger and the innovation literatures, thus suggesting a possible 
new direction of research in this field. However, it is clear that this study has been an 
exploratory exercise, and the validity of this new research direction will have to be largely 
developed and extended through additional studies in the future. Further, both of the selected 
cases analysed in this thesis represent horizontal mergers with companies similar in terms of 
size, product, services, technologies and sectoral systems. It would therefore be interesting to 
test these propositions on different types of mergers, as well as in different sectors and 
national contexts.  
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Appendix A: Accessing the documents and texts used in the merger cases  
Statoil-Hydro 
• Storting’s Proposition 60 (2006-07): Sammenslåing av Statoil og Hydros 
petroleumsvirksomhet, accessible at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/dok/regpubl/stprp/20062007/stprp-nr-60-2006-
2007-.html?id=461986 
• StatoilHydro ASA’s Annual Report 2008, accessible at 
http://www.statoil.com/AnnualReport2008/en/Pages/default.aspx 
• Statoil’s Annual Report 2007, accessible at 
http://www.statoil.com/en/investorcentre/annualreport/2007/pages/default.aspx 
• Statoil’s Annual Report 2006, accessible at 
http://www.statoil.com/en/investorcentre/annualreport/pages/annualreports2006.aspx 
• Hydro’s Annual Report 2007, accessible at	  
http://www.hydro.com/upload/Annual_reporting/annual_2007/downloadcenter/Reports/01
_annual%20report.pdf 
• Hydro’s Annual Report 2006, accessible at 
http://www.hydro.com/upload/Documents/Reports/Annual%20reports/annual_report_200
6.pdf 
• Merger Plan 2006, accessible at 
http://www.statoil.com/en/InvestorCentre/Presentations/Prospectus/Pages/Prospectus.aspx 
• Merger Prospectus, accessible at 
http://www.statoil.com/en/InvestorCentre/Presentations/Prospectus/Pages/Prospectus.aspx 
• Stock market announcement 18th Dec. 2006. 
- Announcement presentation, accessible at 
http://www.statoil.com/en/InvestorCentre/Presentations/Downloads/18dec%20merge
r.pdf 
- Transcript of announcement conference accessible at 
http://www.statoil.com/en/InvestorCentre/Presentations/Downloads/transcript18dece
mber.pdf 
• Information about the Merger Integration Trailing Project accessible at 
http://www.fafo.no/pro/BVS/bvs_tema3_statoilhydro.html 
 
Telenor-Telia 
• Storting’s Proposition 58, 1998-99: Om sammenslåing av Telenor AS og Telia AB, 
accessible at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/sd/documents/reports-to-the-storting-
white-papers/stprp/19981999/stprp-nr-58-1998-99-.html?id=202443 
• Riksdagens Proposition 99, 1998-1999: Sammanslagning av Telia AB och Telenor AS, 
accessible at http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-
skrivelser/Sammanslagning-av-Telia-AB-och_GM0399/?text=true 
• Storting’s Proposition 59, 1999-2000: Om avviklingen av sammenslåingen av Telenor AS 
og Telia AB, accessible at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/sd/dok/regpubl/stprp/19992000/stprp-nr-59-1999-
2000-.html?id=203175 
• Telenor’s Annual Report 1999, accessible at http://telenor.com/investor-
relations/reports/1999/annual-report-1999/ 
	  95	  
• Telia’s Annual Report 1999, accessible at 
http://www.teliasonera.com/en/investors/reports-and-presentations/financial-
reports/2000/annual-reports-1999/ 
• Telenor’s Annual Report 1998, accessible at 
http://www.telenor.no/rapporter/1998/diverse/last_ned.shtml 
• Telia’s Annual Report 1998, accessible for purchase at http://www.bolagsverket.se 
• Telenor-Telia Press Release 19th January 1999, accessible at http://telenor.com/news-and-
media/press-releases/1999/telenor-and-telia-to-be-merged-into-a-new-company/ 
• Telenor-Telia Press Release 31th March 1999, accessible at http://telenor.com/news-and-
media/press-releases/1999/agreement-between-owners-finalised-for-merger-of-telenor-
and-telia/ 
• Telenor Press Release 16th December, accessible at http://telenor.com/news-and-
media/press-releases/1999/tormod-hermansen-ceo-telenortelia/ 
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